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I. Introduction
This essay makes four related points. First, it explains, for an
international audience, the United States' peculiar arrangement for
adjudicating human rights claims in the federal criminal system.
f Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. This article benefitted greatly from
comments received during the University of North Carolina School of Law's third
conference on "The Future of the Adversary System: What Can Europe Learn from the
American Experience?" held in Chapel Hill on April 1, 2011.
I ROBERT BROWNING, ANDREA DEL SARTO (1855).
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In addition, it documents the modern retreat by the Supreme Court
of the United States from 1960s era interventions into state
criminal procedure. Third, it exposes the irony of this modem
retreat, meant to reduce the practical significance of the Court's
prior jurisprudence on rights in the criminal process, given the
current Court's recent pro-defense stance on one important issue.
Fourth, it addresses the interesting question of whether there is
anything to be said from a normative point of view on behalf of
affirming unenforceable rights in the criminal process. The Court
has announced a robust confrontation right in state cases, but it has
little practical power to enforce this prescription due to self-
imposed limits on its remedial options.2 Hence my title-the
Court's "reach" exceeds its "grasp" in the criminal procedure
context.
II. The Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court, and the
Administration of Criminal Justice in the Several
States
A. The Primacy of the States in Enforcing Criminal Law
The Constitution of the United States, adopted in 1789,
imposed a federal government on the existing state republics.'
Although federal authority has grown over time, the states
continue to have primary responsibility for investigating,
prosecuting, and punishing crime. State courts enter
approximately one million felony convictions per year,4 while
federal courts enter only 90,000-nearly one-tenth of that
amount.' The federal docket includes major cases such as
prosecutions for terrorism, organized crime, and high-volume drug
2 See generally DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS,
DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 58 (2003)
(explaining the Warren Court's incorporation of the Confrontation Clause and the
subsequent rulings that limited the Clause).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
4 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CONVICTIONS IN STATE
COURTS-2002 (2004), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc02.pdf.
5 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIR., Table D-
4: CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS DISPOSED OF IN U.S. DIST. COURTS, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/JudicialBusinespdfver
sion.pdf.
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distribution.6 Not all federal cases are so momentous, however.
For example, certainly whether Barry Bonds lied under oath
matters, but consider how much it matters. On the other hand, the
states continue to handle the great majority of forcible felonies,
such as homicide, rape, and aggravated assault.' It remains fair to
say that criminal justice in the United States is primarily a state
responsibility.o
State governments are subject to both their own constitutions
and to the United States Constitution." Under the doctrine of
judicial review, any legislative act-state or federal-that violates
the Constitution can be held invalid by the courts.'2 State courts
are the final authority for state law, including state constitutional
law.'3  State courts also have the authority to decide any issue of
federal law, including federal constitutional law, if a federal issue
is raised in an actual case.'4 Neither the federal courts nor the
great majority of state courts, however, have the authority to issue
advisory opinions." The courts, therefore, can only issue
constitutional rulings when litigation presents constitutional
issues. 16
The Federal Constitution imposes limits on the state criminal
6 Id
7 Id
8 See, e.g., Allen Duke, Jury Deliberates Barry Bonds' Fate, While Reluctant
Witness is Freed, CNN (Apr. 8, 2011) (search on CNN.com home page for "Jury
Deliberates Barry Bonds' Fate") (discussing perjury charges against Barry Bonds).
9 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 4.
10 See, e.g., id at I (recognizing that state courts accounted for 94% of U.S. felony
convictions in 2002).
11 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
12 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803).
13 See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) ("If the state court
decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide
separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review
the decision.").
14 See Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n., 429 U.S. 318, 320 n.3 (1977)
("[S]tate courts of general jurisdiction have the power to decide cases involving federal
constitutional rights where, as here, neither the Constitution nor statute withdraws such
jurisdiction.").
15 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
16 Id.
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process-primarily via the Fourteenth Amendment. 7  The
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in the aftermath of the Civil
War and was designed to prevent the states that rebelled during the
war from oppressing freed slaves and southern Unionists.'" The
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law." 9
From the 1880s to the 1960s, the Supreme Court interpreted
the Due Process Clause as requiring "fundamental fairness,"20 but
the Court did not interpret the clause to require the more specific
procedural safeguards established by the Bill of Rights.2' The Bill
of Rights is the set of amendments to the Federal Constitution that
was adopted in 1791.22 The Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
set forth the rights guaranteed in the criminal process.23  Even
under the "fundamental fairness" standard, the Supreme Court
reversed many state convictions when they involved practices,
such as conducting a capital trial without defense counsel and
allowing admission of evidence obtained during a brutal police
interrogation.24
Before describing the criminal procedure provisions in the Bill
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
18 Id.
19 Id. § 1.
20 See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) ("As applied to a
criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness
essential to the very concept ofjustice.").
21 See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942) ("[F]undamental fairness"
does not require state compliance with the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel
for the indigent absent special circumstances); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908) (the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is made binding on the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534 (1884)
(Fourteenth Amendment due process in state prosecutions does not require grand jury
indictment in "infamous" cases, as is required in federal prosecutions by the Fifth
Amendment).
22 U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
23 U.S. CONST. amends. IV-VI.
24 See, e.g., Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV.
2195 (1996) (explaining theories for applying the due process doctrine to police
interrogations); Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure:
The Supreme Court's Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 303, 350-
80 (2001) (explaining the procedural safeguards implemented in Hurtado v. California).
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of Rights, two additional features of the U.S. law deserve notice.
Under the "state action" doctrine, the Constitution only limits the
conduct of state and federal governments. 5 The Constitution does
not confer rights on private persons as against one another.2 6 In
criminal cases, this means that the Constitution is the defendant's
shield against private prosecution. When public prosecutions
began replacing private prosecutions, victims started to play
relatively minor roles in the U.S. criminal process, other than their
role as witnesses.2 7
Another distinctively American rule is the rigid ban on
government appeals of acquittals.2 8 When an inferior court finds a
defendant not guilty, the issue is not appealable to a higher court.29
A constitutional ruling for the defense, followed by an acquittal, is
not subject to appellate scrutiny.30
B. The Due Process Era's Remedial Structure
An individual prosecuted for a crime in state court clearly has
at least some rights in the state process that are guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution." Under Article VI of the Federal
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S.
465, 475 (1921) (Fourth Amendment does not apply to unreasonable searches and
seizures performed by private parties); David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA
L. REV. 1165, 1221-70 (1999) (explaining how privatized coercive social control makes
the already blurred public/private distinction even less clear than usual).
26 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27 For a discussion of this transformation, see Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales
of Justice: The Case for and the Effects of Utah's Victims' Rights Amendment, 1994
UTAH L. REV. 1373, 1379-80 (1994). According to Cassell, the reasons for the
transformation are unclear. The effect, however, is clear: victims gradually were
excluded from participation in the criminal justice process. Id. They lost any status as
parties to the case. Their primary role became to report crimes to police and to serve as
witnesses. Id.
28 See generally Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some
Consequences of the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 n.2 (1990)
(explaining the ban's origin is the prohibition on double jeopardy).
29 See id. at 4-5 (noting that "a defendant can appeal a conviction by alleging pro-
government legal error in the trial court, but the government cannot appeal an acquittal
by alleging pro-defendant error" and suggesting that "the asymmetry in criminal appeals
may distort the perceptions and incentives of both judges and litigants and thereby bias
the development and application of standards of law").
30 Id. at 5.
31 See generally supra Part II.A (discussing Fourteenth Amendment due process
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Constitution, states and federal judges are required to take an oath
of allegiance to the Federal Constitution.32 However, good faith
adherence to the language of the Constitution is not an inevitable
feature of political practice. Consequently, enforcement of federal
constitutional rights is necessary in state criminal proceedings."
Federal court enforcement of federal constitutional rights in
state criminal prosecutions takes two different procedural forms.
The first is direct review by the Supreme Court of the United
States.34 Section 25 of the Judiciary Act, passed by the first
Congress of 1789, gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction to issue
writs of error to reverse any final judgment of a state court that
upheld "a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State"
against a claim that the statute or authority was "repugnant" to the
Federal Constitution." As soon as the Fourteenth Amendment
recognized substantive federal rights in state criminal cases, state
defendants began seeking writs of error on the ground that their
convictions were rendered in violation of the Federal
Constitution.36 In 1928, Congress abolished the writ of error and
replaced it with the discretionary writ of certiorari." Ever since,
the Supreme Court has had the right, but not the duty, to review
state criminal convictions for violations of the Federal
Constitution.3 8
The other procedure for reviewing state court decisions on a
constitutional basis is the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.39
rights in state courts and the pro-defendant stance on appealing acquittals).
32 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
33 Israel, supra note 24, at 304-05.
34 See generally Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections
Seventy-Five Years After the Judges' Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1649-51 (2000)
(discussing the Supreme Court's Article III jurisdiction).
35 Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86 (1789).
36 See Hartnett, supra note 34, at 1650 (explaining how the Supreme Court's
docket grew after the Civil War).
37 Id. at 1646 (explaining the development of the Judges' Bill, which developed the
certiorari practice of the Supreme Court).
38 Id. at 1713 (noting how the Court has "whittled away at the small remaining
portion of its jurisdiction that was intended to be obligatory").
39 See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 99 (1997) (explaining
how the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was enforced by the Supreme Court in
Moore v. Dempsey).
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After the Civil War, Congress was rightly suspicious of the
administration of justice in the rebellious former Confederate
states. 40 The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 gave federal courts the
power to issue writs of habeas corpus in "all cases where any
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States."4 1 A
petition for habeas corpus is a civil action that tests the legality of
detention.42 A petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the
federal district court that has jurisdiction over the place of
detention.43 The district court's decision is then appealable within
the federal system, provided the court issues a "certificate of
appealability.""
At the time the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 was passed, habeas
was not a remedy for errors in criminal trials.45 Alleged legal
errors were tested either in trial courts on motion in arrest of
judgment or by writs of error sought from higher courts.4 6 The
basic purpose of habeas corpus was the prohibition of extra-
judicial detention.4 7 The classic application of habeas corpus
forces the authorities to charge and try a prisoner or to release
him. 48
A distinction emerged, however, when a committing court
acted outside of its jurisdiction. When a conviction was rendered
for violation of an unconstitutional statute, or a court imposed a
40 See, e.g., id at 85 (discussing Congress' proposal of the Fourteenth Amendment
in response to local law enforcement of "Black Codes" in the Reconstruction South).
41 Habeas Corpus Act, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (1867).
42 DRIPPS, supra note 2, at 21. See generally Developments in the Law: Federal
Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1038, 1040, 1154-55 (1970) ("Habeas corpus is
nominally a civil action," but the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not fully apply in
such actions).
43 See generally Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885) (petition should name
the person with custody of the petitioner as the respondent).
44 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2011).
45 See Brian M. Hoffstadt, The Deconstruction and Reconstruction ofHabeas, 78
S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1189 (2005).
46 See id. at ll89-91.
47 Id.at ll88n.295.
48 See, e.g., Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64
MICH. L. REV. 451, 461 (1966) (stating that habeas corpus relief was not available
historically when the defendant had been judged "on an indictment according to the
course of common law").
3552011]
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sentence more severe than that allowed by law, habeas corpus was
an appropriate remedy.4 9 This exception for jurisdictional error
gradually eliminated the rule that habeas was not a medium for re-
litigating the merits of constitutional claims.o
Theoretically, holding a prisoner on the basis of a judgment
rendered without jurisdiction was no different from holding a
prisoner without a trial. Some constitutional errors were of this
magnitude, as when a show trial was held under the immediate
domination of a lynch mob.5' Over time, however, the federal
courts became increasingly willing to conclude that a federal
constitutional error ousted a state trial court's jurisdiction.5 2
In a trio of cases decided in 1953 under the general title Brown
v. A llen,5 3 the Supreme Court held that any violation of the
Federal Constitution was jurisdictional and thus grounds for the
federal courts to issue a writ.54 At that point in time, there was no
fixed limitations period within which the petitions had to be filed,
no ban on successive petitions raising different claims, and no
rigid requirement of raising federal issues before state courts in the
first instance.
The federal habeas jurisdiction filled the gap in the Supreme
Court's direct review process following the shift from writs of
error to writs of certiorari.56 Yet, the caseloads of the state
criminal courts and the Supreme Court made it impossible for the
Supreme Court to hear every constitutional challenge to every
49 See, e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163
(1873).
50 See generally Hoffstadt, supra note 45, at 1190 (explaining how the Court has
not applied the general principle of res judicata to claims of habeas corpus).
51 See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
52 See DRIPPS, supra note 2, at 21.
53 344 U.S. 443, 449-50 (1953).
54 Id. See generally DRIPPS, supra note 2, at 41-42 (explaining the trend of the
Court to allow any constitutional violation to warrant a petition for habeas corpus).
55 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See generally Developments in the
Law: Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 42, at 1154-60 (explaining habeas corpus
procedure).
56 See generally Developments in the Law: Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 42,
at 1053-55 (explaining the role of federal habeas jurisdiction in the changing landscape
of the Court's jurisdiction).
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state conviction.17  In the modem era, the Supreme Court has
decided a few hundred cases per year at most.58 As we have seen,
the Court has jurisdiction over hundreds of thousands of state
criminal cases in addition to important civil and administrative
cases.59 Since a denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court is not a
decision on the merits, state defendants may have their federal
claims heard in a federal district court even after the Supreme
Court turns them away.60
The federal habeas corpus jurisdiction has always been
controversial, but until the 1960s, the friction it created with the
state courts was kept to tolerable levels; substantive federal
constitutional law was relatively undemanding." State prisoners
remained in prison, serving their sentences, while federal courts
considered habeas petitions.62 Since there was no federal
constitutional law restricting capital punishment, federal habeas
law did not pose an insurmountable obstacle to the execution of
sentences, even when a state's purpose was to kill, rather than to
confine a criminal.63
C. The Warren Court Applies the Bill of Rights to the States
The situation changed in the 1960s. In landmark cases such as
Mapp v. Ohio64 and Gideon v. Wainwright,65 the Supreme Court
held that the criminal procedure provisions in the Bill of Rights
applied to the states by force of the Fourteenth Amendment's more
general due process language.66 Over the course of a decade, the
major rules about the conduct of the state criminal process became
5 See generally Hartnett, supra note 34, at 1649-57 (explaining the development of
the Court's docket).
58 See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SuP.
CT. REv. 403, 403 (1997).
59 Id. at 405-06.
60 See generally Allen, 344 U.S. at 489-97 (explaining that denials of certiorari are
not to be considered judgments on the merits, and thus they do not preclude the
defendant from bringing a petition of habeas corpus).
61 See DRIPPS, supra note 2, at 66-67.
62 Id.
63 Id.
6 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
65 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
66 DRIPPS, supra note 2, at 66-69.
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creatures of federal constitutional law.67 The Fourth Amendment,
including the exclusionary rule as followed in the federal courts,
applied to police search and arrest practices.68 In all felony cases,
the Constitution required states to appoint defense counsel for
indigent defendants at the state's expense. 69  The Miranda rules
ushered in operational changes to state and federal police
interrogations.7 0
The Warren Court's rulings, including the criminal procedure
cases, angered political conservatives. When Richard Nixon
became President in 1968, he appointed new justices who were
more sympathetic to the prosecution than the justices they
replaced. Jimmy Carter, the one Democrat who held the
presidency between 1969 and 1992, made no appointments to the
Supreme Court. President Reagan continued the pattern of
appointing relatively conservative judges to the Court." As a
result, the Supreme Court became increasingly conservative and
hostile to the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions.7 2
The more conservative Court, however, still produced some
liberal rulings. The Burger Court subjected capital punishment to
a so-called "guided discretion" requirement under the Eighth
67 See generally id. at 69 ("[C]oncluding that criminal procedure is subject largely
to the Bill of Rights and interest-balancing.").
68 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-47 (1961).
69 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
70 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
71 See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith & Linda Fry, Vigilance or Accommodation: The
Changing Supreme Court and Religious Freedom, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 893, 894-95
(1991) (explaining that as of 1991, "Republican control of the White House coincided
with the retirement of three Justices during the 1980's: Potter Stewart, 1981; Warren
Burger, 1986; and Lewis Powell, 1987. President Reagan was able to elevate William
Rehnquist to Chief Justice and to appoint three new Justices, Sandra Day O'Connor,
Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy. The 1990's dawned with President Bush's
appointment of David Souter to replace the retiring Justice William Brennan and the
appointment of Clarence Thomas to replace retiring Justice Thurgood Marshall. Only
one holdover Justice, Byron White, remains from the Warren Court era.").
72 See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, All the Supreme Court Really Needs to Know it
Learned from the Warren Court, 50 VAND. L. REV. 459, 475-76 (1997) (explaining the
downplay of ideological differences between the Warren and Rehnquist Courts that "the
current Court is almost incontrovertibly more conservative than the Warren Court" on
criminal procedure, a field in which "although few major Warren Court cases have been
overruled, many have been so narrowly interpreted as to render them almost
meaningless").
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Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause." The death
penalty cases divided the justices into multiple camps, resulting in
a complicated and confusing body of case law that has grown
steadily over the years.74
The Court's ideological turn to favor the prosecution in
procedural matters and its substantive intervention in capital cases
had implications for the remedial structure that operated during the
Warren Court era. Both direct review in the Supreme Court and
the habeas process in the lower federal courts became less
credible." Except in capital cases, the threat of federal court
review of state convictions for federal constitutional violations
became highly unusual.
III. The Supreme Court's Gradual Abdication
In response to the judicial activism of the Warren Court,76
conservative justices faced a dilemma.7 7 On the one hand, these
justices opposed the Warren Court's decisions on first principles.7 8
On the other hand, these same justices proclaimed a strong respect
for the precedent.79 Rather than overrule the Warren Court's
landmark decisions, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts found ways
to limit the practical effect of these decisions, one step in this
direction was to limit the remedies available for constitutional
violations. The Court generally avoided striking down precedent,
but strategically curtailed the remedies available for the rights
73 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that
standardless jury discretion to impose death or life imprisonment for murder violates the
Eighth Amendment).
74 See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 998 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (arguing that the
Court's capital punishment jurisprudence requires both rationality and discretion, and
these are incompatible; therefore, capital punishment cannot be administered in a
constitutional manner).
75 See generally Joseph L. Hoffmann, The Supreme Court's New Vision of Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 1989 Sup. CT. REv. 165, 167 (1989) (explaining the
recent trend in habeas corpus cases).
76 Id. at 179.
77 DRIPPS, supra note 2, at xiii.
78 Michael J. Gerhardt, The Pressure of Precedent: A Critique of the Conservative
Approaches to Stare Decisis in Abortion Cases, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 67, 69-70 (1993).
79 Id. at 69.
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declared in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments."
A. Rules and Practices Limiting the Supreme Court's Power
ofDirect Review
In the post-Warren Court era, the Supreme Court limited its
own power of direct review in several ways. First, in several areas
of doctrine, the Court held that constitutional violations did not
require reversal of the conviction unless the outcome would have
been different had the violation not occurred."' The defense has
the burden of showing that, but for violations of the right to
effective assistance of counsel82 or to pretrial disclosure of
exculpatory evidence, the outcome might have been different.
The Court also adopted an "inevitable discovery" exception to the
exclusionary rule under which the government must prove that,
but for the constitutional violation, illegally obtained evidence
would have been discovered by legal means.84 Regardless of
where the burden of proof lies, these prejudice requirements
permit the government to punish the accused despite constitutional
violations in the process.
Secondly, the Court has recognized a variety of "good faith"
exceptions for police and prosecutors.8 6 When police reasonably
rely on a defective warrant, an unconstitutional statute, or an
erroneous court record, there is an exception to the exclusionary
80 Id.
81 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (requiring a defendant
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel to show both deficient performance and
prejudice, and a "reasonable probability" that the outcome would have been more
favorable for the defendant but for counsel's deficient performance); see also United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) ("The evidence is material only if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.").
82 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
83 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
84 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984).
85 William M. Cohn, Sixth Amendment-Inevitable Discovery: A Valuable but
Easily Abused Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 75 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 729,
754 (1984).
86 Arizona v. Evans, 518 U.S. 1 (1995); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987);
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
87 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 907.
88 See Krull, 480 U.S. at 342.
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rule.8 9 This "qualified immunity" defense protects officers from
tort liability in each of these situations as well as in many others.90
Recently, the Court held that in damage actions against the police,
the trial court need not address the merits of the constitutional
issue if the police have a meritorious immunity defense."
The third method through which the Court has reduced its
power of direct review is the crude but consequential device of
reducing its caseload. Since the Court can refuse to hear cases, the
justices set the volume of the work themselves.92 During the
Warren and Burger periods, the Court heard about 150 cases per
year.93 The figure is now under 100.94 Chief Justice Rehnquist
persuaded his colleagues to hear fewer cases when he took charge
of the Court,9 5 and the modem Court has continued this trend."
As mentioned previously, there are nearly one million state
felony convictions per year.9 7 About 5% of these convictions
89 See Evans, 514 U.S. at 4.
90 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 637 (1987); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 340 (1986).
91 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243 (2009).
92 See, e.g., Joan Maisel Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 976
(1957) (explaining the lex non scripta but clearly established "rule of four": four of the
nine Justices must vote to hear the case before it is brought to the Court on certiorari).
93 Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 57 (2009) ("In the 1980s, the Court had approximately 5,000 cases on its annual
docket, and it decided around 150 of those cases (3 percent).").
94 See id ("[T]he Court's docket today includes about 9,000 cases, and it decides
fewer than ninety cases (less than 1%). There have, of course, been calls in recent years
for the Court to issue more rulings on the merits. But even if the Court decided 150 or
200 cases per year (as some have suggested), it would dispose of only a fraction of its
nine thousand case docket and could not possibly correct every error in lower court
interpretations of federal law.") (footnotes omitted).
95 Hellman, supra note 58, at 430.
96 Kenneth W. Starr, Essay: The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The
Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1363, 1369 (2006); see also The
Supreme Court, 2009 Term: The Statistics, 124 HARV. L. REV. 411, 411 (2010) (stating
that in the 2009 term, constitutional issues came to the Supreme Court on direct review
in ten cases, and the Court decided eighteen habeas cases during the 2009 term).
97 Sean Rosenmerkel, Matthew Durose & Donald Farole, Jr., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006-
STATISTICAL TABLES, at 1 (Nov. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf.
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result from trials rather than a guilty pleas." Twenty-eight is
0.056% of 50,000. In comparison, the IRS audits about 0.77% of
all tax returns for compliance, a prospect remote enough to be
known as "the audit lottery."99
B. Limitations on Federal Habeas for State Prisoners
The ideologically reoriented Court had a jaundiced view of
federal habeas jurisdiction over state convictions.'o The Burger
Court did not attempt to revive the "jurisdictional error" theory of
the early twentieth century. 0 ' It ruled that search-and-seizure
claims were not cognizable on habeas, coming too late to deter
police misconduct.'0 2 More significantly, in Wainwright v.
Sykes,'03 the Burger Court ruled that the failure to raise a federal
claim at the state level precluded litigating it on habeas, absent a
showing of good cause for the failure to raise the claim and a
showing of prejudice to the defense.' 04
In noncapital cases, habeas litigation does not defeat the
government's penal objectives. In capital cases, however, the very
process of prolonged litigation keeps the condemned prisoner alive
when the state wants him dead.' The notorious serial killers John
Wayne Gacy and Theodore "Ted" Bundy were both executed
more than a decade after their convictions.'06 Some other cases
98 Donald J. Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain
Justice, 46 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sc. 780, 781 (1956). Constitutional
issues arise, moreover, in sentencing following a guilty plea, as well as in determining
the validity of a plea.
99 See, e.g., Vincent C. Kalafat, Rethinking Treasury Regulation § 1.162-5 and
Slaying the Monster in the Education Tax Maze, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1085, 2022
(2005) (explaining how unlikely it is that the IRS will audit a taxpayer's return).
100 See generally DRIPPS, supra note 2, at 67-69 (explaining the shift in habeas
structure after the Warren Court).
101 Id. at 66.
102 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,482 (1976).
103 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
104 Id. at 91.
105 Id.
106 See Gacy v. Illinois, 468 N.E.2d 1171 (1984), cert. denied 470 U.S. 1037 (1985)
(showing that the Supreme Court denied Gacy's habeas petition in 1985); see also Rob
Karwath & Susan Kuczka, All Appeals Fail: Gacy is Executed, CHI. TRIB., May 10,
1994, at 1 (noting that Gacy's execution was delayed by collateral attack proceedings for
nine years). Bundy was convicted at trials in 1979 and 1980, and he was executed in
362 [Vol. XXXVII
CRAWFORD IN CALIFORNIA
took longer.'o Pressure grew to limit the potential of federal
habeas to support indefinite litigation.'0 8
Following the Court's ruling in Sykes, a habeas petitioner may
not raise a federal claim unless he raised the same claim in the
state courts.109 What about claims that were raised in the state
courts? In Teague v. Lane,"o a plurality of the Court held that
newly-fashioned constitutional rules of criminal procedure did not
apply retroactively in habeas corpus proceedings."' If a state
defendant's case could still, at least theoretically, reach the
Supreme Court on direct review, the new Supreme Court rules
would apply.' 12  Once, however, the direct review process
concluded, the state conviction could be set aside only if the
federal court determined the state decision to be contrary to federal
law at the time of the state decision." 3
After much controversy,' 14 Congress addressed federal habeas
in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
in 1996."' AEDPA provides a one-year limitations period-
running from the date of "the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review"-for filing a
habeas petition." 6 The Act carries over the exhaustion
requirement from Sykes and goes further than Teague by requiring
1989. In Bundy's case, however, most of the delay occurred during the process of direct
review; the habeas process took two and a half years. See Donald P. Lay, The Writ of
Habeas Corpus: A Complex Procedure for a Simple Process, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1015,
1048-49 (1993).
107 See Lay, supra note 106, at 1048 (noting that one case took over fourteen years).
10 See id. (discussing dissatisfaction with the delay in death penalty litigation and
the creation of an ad hoc committee to study the lengthy procedure).
109 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977).
110 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
11M Id. at 298.
112 Id. at 310.
113 Id.
114 See, e.g., Larry W. Yackle, Federal Habeas Corpus Statute, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.
J. 135, 136 n.4 (1996) ("It is no secret that the 104th Congress was sharply divided along
ideological lines. That fact of political life explains much about how and why the bills
that contributed provisions to the 1996 Act were developed."). But see John H. Blume,
AEDPA: The 'Hype and the 'Byte', 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 261 (2006)
115 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
116 Blume, supra note 114, at 270.
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the federal courts to defer to state court interpretations of federal
law."' Under AEDPA, the federal court may vacate a state
conviction only when the state court's ruling "resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States.""' In Williams v.
Taylor,l' a majority of the Court concluded that this provision
permits the federal courts to overturn state convictions only when
the state court's interpretation of Supreme Court jurisprudence
was "objectively unreasonable."' 2 0
Today, a state prisoner faces a series of very serious practical
obstacles to securing federal habeas relief. First, the exhaustion
requirement means that only prisoners serving substantial
sentences only have an incentive to file after the state process has
run its course.12 ' Second, while Gideon requires appointment of
counsel for indigent defendants at trial,'22 there is no constitutional
right to appointed counsel after the first appeal of right following
conviction.'2 3 Third, under AEDPA, any claim not presented to
the state court may be heard only after a showing of good cause
and prejudice.'2 4 If the claim is presented to the state court (and
rejected), the state court's ruling stands unless objectively
unreasonable under the Supreme Court jurisprudence at the time
of the state decision.'25 If all these hurdles are overcome, the
petitioner still must succeed on the merits.'26 As mentioned in the
117 Id. at 260 (discussing the "deference provision" of the law).
118 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996).
'19 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
120 Id. at 409.
121 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22432, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS:
AN ABRIDGED SKETCH 3 (2006).
122 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
123 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-54 (1991) (holding there is
no right to effective assistance of counsel in a capital state after the conviction
proceeding because there is no underlying right to counsel); Wainwright v. Torna, 455
U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982) (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 617 (1974)) (holding no
right exists to effective assistance of counsel in a state discretionary appeal because there
is no right to counsel in the first place).
124 DOYLE, supra note 121, at 5.
125 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000).
126 DOYLE, supra note 121, at 4.
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discussion of direct review, when the merits are reached, reversal
of the conviction is not always required even in cases of
constitutional error.127
Given all these barriers to success, Joseph Hoffmann and
Nancy King have proffered a powerful argument for simply
abolishing noncapital habeas.'2 8 They note that tens of thousands
of petitions are filed each year, but only a handful end in relief on
the merits.129 John Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, and Keir Weyble
responded to Hoffmann and King's proposal in a spirited article,
stating that "federal habeas corpus continues to play an important
role in encouraging meaningful state court review and providing a
safety net for deserving prisoners whom the state courts have
failed."' Even Blume and his coauthors, however, admit the
limited prospects of success under the current law."' They note
that their review of four years of federal appellate decisions found
only 154 rulings providing some relief on the merits.'32 So of the
tens of thousands of petitions filed annually, on average fewer
than forty have succeeded.'33
Let us imagine a state court judge who contemplates a dubious
ruling on a constitutional question and attempts to estimate the
probability of reversal by the federal courts. There is, very
roughly, a one in 2,000 chance of direct review by the Supreme
Court,'3 4 and even then the conviction might stand because the
127 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243 (2009).
128 Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State
Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 819 (2009).
129 See id. at 809-10 ("[W]e estimate that fewer than sixty-five of the more than
18,000 petitions filed each year by noncapital petitioners will eventually be granted.")
(footnote omitted).
130 John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Keir M. Weyble, In Defense of
Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435, 435
(2011).
131 Id. at 452.
132 Id.
133 This statement assumes, not unrealistically, that the state will almost always
appeal a federal district court decision granting the writ.
134 To complete this calculation, I assume that there are about 50,000 felony
convictions rendered after trial in the state courts and that twenty-five is the realistic
upper limit on the number of certiorari grants by the Supreme Court in state criminal
cases. See generally Rosenmerkel, Durose & Farole, Jr., supra note 97, at 5 (providing
estimates of felony convictions in state courts); Hoffmann & King, supra note 128, at
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defense is unable to show prejudice after the trial.' As for
habeas, even if the defendant ultimately files a petition, the
statistical expectation is that less than one petition in 400 results in
some modification of the state decision.136
The Supreme Court, however, continues to regulate state
criminal procedure under the Federal Constitution. Indeed, in
some areas, such as jury selection and sentencing procedure, the
modem Court has issued more favorable rulings to the defense
than those issued by the Warren Court."' The most dramatic pro-
defense ruling from the Court in recent years is Crawford v.
Washington.38  In the remainder of this article, I pursue the
following question: What is the purpose of Supreme Court
decisions declaring new rights in the criminal process, when
federal courts lack the institutional power to enforce state court
compliance with them?
IV. Crawford in California
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Crawford and its Progeny
The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause declares that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."' 3 9 The
provision was inspired by the American revulsion of trial-by-
affidavit, exemplified in the treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.
Modem jurisprudence interpreting the clause began with Crawford
v. Washington. 4 0
In Crawford, Michael Crawford and his wife, Sylvia, sought
809 (explaining that habeas corpus is a "pipe dream" for prisoners).
135 DOYLE, supra note 121, at 5.
136 This calculation is based on the assumptions that 18,000 petitions are filed per
year and that forty of these petitioners ultimately win some relief Hoffmann & King,
supra note 128, at 809; see supra note 134 and accompanying text (author's calculation).
137 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) ("[T]he provision of
the federal sentencing statute that makes the Guidelines mandatory . . . [is] incompatible
with [the] constitution[]"); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that
defendants may establish equal protection violation based on prosecutor's peremptory
challenges without proof of general practice or pattern of discrimination across cases).
138 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
139 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
140 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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out Kenneth Lee after Kenneth allegedly attempted to rape
Sylvia.'4 ' Michael stabbed Kenneth during the ensuing
confrontation. 4 2  Police arrested Michael and administered
Miranda warnings to Michael and Sylvia.143 Sylvia's subsequent
statement to the police cast doubt on Michael's claim of self-
defense, but at Michael's trial for assault and attempted murder,
the invocation of marital privilege meant that Sylvia was unable to
testify.'44 The prosecution offered Sylvia's taped statement as
evidence and claimed a "hearsay exception for statements contrary
to penal interest."' 45 The trial court admitted the evidence and
rejected Crawford's constitutional objection under the Sixth
Amendment. 4 6 The court found the statement reliable under the
test established in Ohio v. Roberts.'47 On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Washington upheld Crawford's conviction.'4 8 Crawford
then sought review from the Supreme Court of the United States,
arguing that Roberts "stray[ed] from the original meaning of the
Confrontation Clause." 4 9
In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the majority agreed to
replace the Roberts test.' Under the Crawford approach, a court
considering prosecution hearsay must first characterize the hearsay
statement as either "testimonial" or "nontestimonial."
An accuser who makes a formal statement to government
officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a
casual remark to an acquaintance does not. The constitutional
text, like the history underlying the common law right of
confrontation, thus reflects an especially acute concern with a
141 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38-40 (2004).
142 Id.
143 Id at 38.
144 Id. at 39-40.
145 Id. at 40.
146 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
147 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
148 Id. at 41.
149 Id. at 42.
150 See id. at 67.
151 Id. at 68.
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specific type of out-of-court statement.S2
If the statement is testimonial, it may be admitted only if the
declarant is unavailable and the defense had an opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant about the statement before trial.'53
Notably, the Crawford Court did not define the precise
meaning of "testimonial"' 5 4 and left open to interpretation the
appropriate legal treatment of statements that are not determined
to be testimonial."' However, Davis v. Washingtonl56 gave the
Court ready opportunity to clarify the Crawford test.'17 In Davis, a
domestic battery victim called 911, but the connection was
interrupted before any words were exchanged.'5 ' The 911 operator
"reversed the call, and Michelle McCottry answered. In the
ensuing conversation, the operator ascertained that McCottry was
involved in a domestic disturbance with her former boyfriend
Adrian Davis. "' When police arrived, they "observed . .. the
'fresh injuries on [McCottry's] forearm and . .. face."'l 6 0 At trial,
McCottry did not testify.16' The police testified as to their
observations, but the only evidence identifying Davis as
152 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
153 Id. at 68.
154 Id. at 51-52. ("Various formulations of this core class of 'testimonial' statements
exist: 'ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to
be used prosecutorially, . . . 'extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,'. . .
statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. These
formulations all share a common nucleus and then define the Clause's coverage at
various levels of abstraction around it. Regardless of the precise articulation, some
statements qualify under any definition-for example, ex parte testimony at a preliminary
hearing.").
155 See id at 53 ("[E]ven if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with
testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object."). One wonders how many memos went
among the chambers before agreement was reached on this sentence.
156 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
157 Id. at 817.
158 Id.
'59 Id
160 Id. at 818.
161 Davis, 547 U.S. at 819.
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McCottry's assailant was a recording of her conversation with the
911 operator. 162
In Hammon v. Indiana,'6 ' authorities responded after receiving
a report of domestic disturbance at Amy and Hershel Hammon's
home." Once out of Hershel's presence, Amy accused Hershel of
beating her and completed an affidavit describing her attack. 6
Although Amy was subpoenaed, she did not appear at trial.166
The trial court allowed an officer to testify as to Amy's oral
statements about Hershel and her affidavit.167 The court held that
the hearsay rule was satisfied by Indiana's expansive exceptions
for present-sense impressions and excited utterances. 168 On
appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld Hershel Hammon's
conviction, classifying Amy's statements as nontestimonial.169
The court conceded that the affidavit was testimonial under
Crawford. However, after considering the admissibility of Amy's
statements and the fact that the case was tried by a judge rather
than a jury, the Indiana Supreme Court determined that admission
of the affidavit was harmless error.'
In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court
issued three holdings in Davis and Hammon.'7 1 First, the Court
held that the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial
hearsay.'72 "A limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the
constitutional provision must fairly be said to mark out not merely
its 'core,' but its perimeter." 7 1
Second, the Court held that McCottry's telephone conversation
162 Id.
163 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
164 Davis, 547 U.S. at 819 (quoting Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 446-47).
165 Id. at 820 ("Amy handwrote the following: 'Broke our furnace and shoved me
down on the floor into the broken glass. Hit me in the chest and threw me down. Broke
our lamps and phone. Tore up my van where I couldn't leave the house. Attacked my
daughter."'(quoting Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at n.1)).
166 Id. at 820.
167 Id.
168 Id.; see also FED. R. EvID. 803(1), (2).
169 Davis, 547 U.S. at 821.
170 See id. at 821.
171 See id. at 824-34 (consolidating these cases for review).
172 See id at 824.
173 Id.
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with a 911 operator was nontestimonial.174 "[T]he circumstances
of McCottry's interrogation objectively indicate its primary
purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency. [McCottry] simply was not acting as a witness; she
was not testifing.""' As such, the Court upheld Davis'
conviction based on the admissible evidence of the nontestimonial
911 call.176
Third, Amy Hammon's statements to police at her home,
accusing Hershel of assaulting her, were held to be testimonial. 7 7
"Objectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose
of the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime.""' In
Hammon, the defense never had an opportunity to cross-examine
Amy Hammon."' The two exceptions to the cross-examination
requirement recognized in Crawford-dying declarations and
forfeiture by wrongdoing-did not apply.' Therefore, following
the test in Crawford required the reversal of Hershel Hammon's
conviction.'
The only dissenting voice on the Supreme Court belonged to
Justice Thomas, who would have held that Amy Hammon's
statements to the police were nontestimonial.'82 Whereas Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor defended the Roberts test
in Crawford, their replacements, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito, instead followed the precedent set in Crawford."'
Crawford recognized an exception for hearsay statements by a
witness whose unavailability at trial resulted from the wrongdoing
of the accused. 8 4 Some lower courts interpreted this "forfeiture
by wrongdoing" to cover statements by murder victims, even
when preventing testimony was not the defendant's apparent
174 Id. at 828.
175 Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
176 Id at 834.
177 Id. at 830.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 820.
180 Davis, 547 U.S. at 834; see also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2), (6).
181 Davis, 547 U.S. at 834.
182 See id. at 840.
183 See id. at 813-15.
184 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
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motive.' The Court rejected this doctrine of reflexive forfeiture
in Giles v. California.'"' In Giles, the Court held that the
prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant silenced the witness with the purpose of preventing
testimony in order to show forfeiture by wrongdoing.'
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,8 8 the Court grappled with
whether laboratory analysts who prepared sworn certificates as to
the criminal nature of a tested substance were "witnesses subject
to the defendant's right of confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment."' 89 The justices were divided in a five-four split.'90
The majority, per Justice Scalia, the author of Crawford,
concluded that the certificates were tantamount to affidavits, made
purely for use at a subsequent criminal trial; as such, the defendant
had a right to confront the analysts who created these
certificates.19 ' The majority characterized this result as a "rather
straightforward application of [the Court's] holding in
Crawford."'9 2 The dissent, however, maintained that scientific
analysts are categorically different from other witnesses, and,
therefore, the defendant had no right to confront them.'93
The Court's most recent Crawford decision, Michigan v.
Bryant,9 4 took a somewhat expansive view of the emergency
doctrine established in Davis. 195 In Bryant, police officers found a
mortally wounded victim, Covington, at a gas station.'96 He had
been shot at the defendant Bryant's house approximately twenty-
five minutes earlier.'9 7 When officers asked Covington to identify
185 See, e.g., Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 356-58 (2008) (detailing an
application of the "forfeiture by wrongdoing" exception in California).
186 Id. at 358-68.
187 See id.
188 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
189 Id. at 2530.
190 Id
191 See id. at 2532.
192 Id. at 2533.
193 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543-44.
194 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
195 See id. at 1150-67.
196 Id at 1150.
I97 Id
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his shooter, he named Bryant and described the incident.'98 A few
hours later, Covington died at the hospital.19 9
Over the tart dissent of Justice Scalia, the majority held that
Covington's statements were nontestimonial. 20 0 The declarant was
grievously wounded, the police questioning was informal, and the
gunman was at-large when the statements were made.20'
Considering these factors, Justice Sotomayor's opinion for the
majority concluded that the "primary purpose" of the police
questioning was to deal with an ongoing emergency situation
rather than to build a case for trial,202 which would have made the
statements testimonial. 20 3  The majority cautioned, however, that
an emergency is not necessarily ongoing "in every place or even
just surrounding the victim for the entire time that the perpetrator
of a violent crime is on the loose." 204 When "the offender flees
with little prospect of posing a threat to the public," the emergency
is over.205
Synthesizing the Supreme Court's case law, one can identify
some fairly clear rules, as well as some areas of open texture.
Testimonial statements include grand jury testimony, affidavits,
and statements made during police interrogation in nonemergency
situations, such as the aforementioned stationhouse questioning of
Sylvia Crawford. 2 06 Testimonial hearsay can be admitted: to prove
matters other than the truth of the facts asserted; when the
defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at the
trial; and when the declarant is unavailable, and the defendant had
an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant before the trial. 2 07 It
also seems fairly clear that a genuine dying declaration would be
198 Id
199 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150
200 Id. at 1150-68.
201 Id. at 1163-67.
202 Id. at 1166-67.
203 See id
204 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159.
205 Id
206 See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58-68 (holding formal statements are
testimonial).
207 See generally id. at 50-69 (discussing when the admission of testimonial hearsay
is constitutionally appropriate under the Sixth Amendment).
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admissible, even if it was testimonial in character. 20t
Areas of open texture include: (1) The scope of the ongoing
emergency doctrine; (2) the application of Melendez-Diaz to lab
reports under factually distinct settings, as where a supervisor
testifies about the technician's report or when the report is offered,
purportedly, not for truth but as the basis of an expert's opinion;
(3) the efforts that must be made to locate and secure the witness
for trial; and (4) the adequacy of a prior opportunity for cross-
examination when the prosecution offers testimonial hearsay from
an unavailable declarant.
B. Crawford in California
Given the limitations that have emerged over the last three
decades on both direct review in the Supreme Court and on habeas
corpus review in the federal district courts, what is the effect in the
state courts of a new, pro-defendant ruling from the Supreme
Court? To investigate this question, I examined Crawford cases in
the California courts and habeas cases in the California federal
district courts. As California is only one jurisdiction, my
investigation was limited in scope. Even so, what I have found is
suggestive enough to support a conversation.
As a traditionally "blue state" currently represented by two
democratic senators and a democratic governor, California is a
relatively liberal American jurisdiction.2 09 Nonetheless, California
is an extraordinarily punitive jurisdiction. California retains and
occasionally inflicts the death penalty, while likewise enforcing a
notorious "three strikes" sentencing enhancement.210 Recently, the
Supreme Court received an appeal by the state of a lower court's
order requiring the state to release enough prisoners to bring the
208 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1176-77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
209 See generally CA.Gov, http:/gov.ca.gov/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (reporting
on the works of Governor Brown); DIANNE FEINSTEIN, http://feinstein.senate.gov/public/
(last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (detailing the works of Senator Feinstein); U.S. SENATOR
BARBARA BOXER: CALIFORNIA, http://boxer.senate.gov/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2011)
(noting the works of Senator Boxer).
210 See Warren Richey, Supreme Court to Hear California Prison Overcrowding
Case, CHRISTIAN ScL. MONITOR (June 14, 2010),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/0614/Supreme-Court-to-hear-California-
prison-overcrowding-case.
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population down to 137.5% of design capacity.211
California appellate judges are appointed by the governor and
subject to unopposed retention elections every twelve years.212
Given California's "tough on crime" approach to criminal justice,
governors have reason to select judges who will be perceived as
"tough on crime."2 13 Judges also realize that, other than scandal, a
public perception of coddling criminals is sufficient reason to lose
a retention election.2 14
Federal judges appointed under Article III of the U.S.
Constitution hold their offices during good behavior and are
effectively appointed for life.215 While some federal judges may
hope for judicial promotions, the federal bench is inherently more
insulated from political incentives than a state bench requiring re-
election. 216 The federal bench is also generally regarded as more
prestigious than the state bench and is therefore able to attract and
retain more qualified personnel. 2 17  Given these differences
between the state and federal courts, state judges might be more
inclined to favor the prosecution than their federal counterparts.
California courts generally resolve cases in areas of open
texture in favor of the prosecution.218 There appears to be no
evidence of blatant nullification. Instead, courts exploit doctrinal
ambiguities and procedural tools such as waiver or harmless error
to avoid reversing convictions for Crawford violations.219
211 Id.
212 See California Secretary of State, Official Voter Information Guide, About
Judicial Retention Elections, available at http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/voter-
infor/about-judicial-retention-elections.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2011).
213 See generally Marc Mauer, Why are Tough on Crime Policies so Popular?, 11
STAN. L. & POL'Y R~v. 9 (1999-2000) (discussing "tough on crime" trends in the
criminal justice system).
214 Id.
215 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
216 See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1120 (1977)
(discussing political differences between the state and federal courts). See generally
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM (1996)
(evaluating the federal judiciary).
217 Neuborne, supra note 216, at 1120 (explaining that federal trial courts tend to be
better equipped to analyze complex, often conflicting lines of authority and more likely
to produce competently written, persuasive opinions than are state trial courts).
218 See infra Appendix 1.
219 See infra Appendix 1.
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In 2010, the California appellate courts decided seventeen
reported Crawford cases.220 Many more cases went unreported. I
focus on the reported cases because the criteria for publication
provide a good proxy for borderline cases and because the sample
size is more manageable.
In eight of the reported cases, the court found that the
defendant's Crawford claim was without merit. In two cases, the
defendant testified.22 1 In two other cases, the facts found on the
record indicated the hearsay was not testimonial. 2 2  A decision
recognizing an exception to the Crawford doctrine for bona fide
dying declarations seems reasonable given the Court's dictum in
Crawford.2 23 I likewise found a decision denying Crawford's
applicability in probation cases solidly grounded in the text of the
Sixth Amendment. 24  In another case, the court found adequate
opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary hearing, despite
limited discovery at that stage of the proceedings.22 5 In another
case, the court avoided the Crawford issue by ruling that if there
had been an error, it was harmless.226 One court has avoided the
Crawford issue by reversing the conviction on another ground.2 27
220 See infra Appendix 1.
221 People v. Redd, 229 P.3d 101, 136-37 (Cal. 2010) (holding that the Crawford
objection was without merit, but the defendant nevertheless waived a potential Crawford
objection to admission of pre-trial identifications by eyewitnesses who testified at trial);
see also People v. Cowan, 236 P.3d 1074, 1126 (Cal. 2010) (rejecting Crawford claim
respecting declarant who testified at trial).
222 People v. Letner, 235 P.3d 62, 137 (Cal. 2010) (holding letters between
defendants and an associate not testimonial hearsay); People v. Lynch, 237 P.3d 416,
460 (Cal. 2010) (holding conversation between victim and victim's mother in hospital
not testimonial absent record evidence of police participation in the conversation).
223 See People v. D'Arcy, 226 P.3d 949, 971-73 (Cal. 2010) (rejecting Crawford
challenge to dying declaration). But cf Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6 ("The one
deviation we have found involves dying declarations. The existence of that exception as
a general rule of criminal hearsay law cannot be disputed.").
224 People v. Minor, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 228, 241 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that
Crawford was inapplicable in proceeding to extend period of probation).
225 People v. Hollinquest, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 551, 562-65 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(holding that the declarant validly claimed Fifth Amendment privilege and was therefore
unavailable, and so the opportunity for cross-examination at preliminary hearing was
adequate despite a lack of complete discovery at that time).
226 People v. Jennings, 237 P.3d 474, 501-02 (Cal. 2010) (declining to reach merits
of Crawford claim and finding error harmless).
227 People v. Navarrete, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 666, 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (reversing
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Seven reported cases ruled on more plausible Crawford
claims. The defense won only one of these cases.228 In several
cases, the California courts struggled to distinguish Supreme Court
precedents, resulting in dubious rulings.2 29
In People v. Nelson,230 a shooting victim who was on the way
to the hospital in an ambulance identified "John Paul" as the
shooter.23 1 The injured victim identified the shooter to a
firefighter, not to a police officer, soon after the shooting.2 32 The
Supreme Court, however, had not yet decided Bryant.233 It seems
hard to distinguish the first responder from a 911 operator. The
victim's statement was not a call for help because help had indeed
arrived.2 34 The statement was both accusatory and retrospective.2 35
In People v. Johnson,2 36 the victim called 911 to report that
her husband had fired a gun at her in their home. 237  The victim
made the call from her automobile after escaping from home.2 38 If
this case had been decided after Bryant, the prosecution may have
had a stronger position, but at the time of the decision, Davis and
Hammon did not provide the prosecution with a very strong
case.239
In four cases, California courts dealt with Crawford challenges
to scientific test reports.24 0 In People v. Benitez,24 1 the lab report
was introduced through the testimony of a supervisor, and the
on other grounds and therefore not passing on defendant's Crawford claim).
228 See infra Appendix 1.
229 See infra Appendix 1.
230 People v. Nelson, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
231 Id at 59.
232 Id
233 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
234 Nelson, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 59.
235 Id.
236 People v. Johnson, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 132, 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
237 Id. at 134.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 136-39.
240 People v. Benitez, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); People v. Bowman,
107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); People v. Chikosi, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 464
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010); People v. Miller, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
241 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
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technician who actually performed the test did not testify.242 The
court held that Melendez-Diaz controlled and reversed the
conviction.
In the other three cases, the courts rejected the Crawford
claim. 24 4 In People v. Bowman,24 5 the facts were virtually identical
to those in Benitez.246 The court, however, held that Melendez-
Diaz did not apply because the technician's report recorded
contemporaneous observations. 24 7  The court relied on similar
reasoning in People v. Miller.2 48 The Supreme Court of California
also relied on this distinction in Geier v. California,249 but this
decision was seemingly undone by the Supreme Court's
Melendez-Diaz ruling, which rejected the contemporaneous
recording distinction.2 50 In People v. Chikosi,2 5 ' the officer who
performed the breathalyzer test testified, but the officer who
prepared the maintenance report on the machine did not.252 The
court held that the maintenance report was not testimonial given
the defendant's ability to cross-examine the testing officer.253 The
basis for this ruling was not entirely clear. The California
Supreme Court granted discretionary review in all four cases.254
In People v. Herrera,2 55 a prosecution witness testified at the
preliminary hearing, subject to cross-examination by the defense,
242 Id. at 42.
243 Id. at 44.
244 See infra Appendix 1.
245 Bowman, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 157-58.
246 Benitez, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 42.
247 Bowman, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 161.
248 161 P.3d 104, 139-40 (Cal. 2007).
249 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 580, 621-22 (Cal. 2007).
250 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2535 (explaining that the dissent's claim that near-
contemporaneous declarations are not testimonial "misunderstands the role that 'near-
contemporaneity' has played in our case law.").
251 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
252 Id. at 465-66.
253 Id. at 469.
254 See People v. Benitez, 230 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2010); People v. Bowman, 232 P.3d
611 (Cal. 2010); People v. Chikosi, 237 P.3d 415 (Cal. 2010); People v. Miller, 242 P.3d
68 (Cal. 2010).
255 232 P.3d 710 (Cal. 2010).
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that the defendant had confessed to the charged offense.256 The
witness was subsequently deported to El Salvador, which does not
have a treaty with the United States for securing the appearance of
witnesses.25 The fact-bound issue was whether the prosecution
made the required good-faith efforts to find the witness before the
witness was deemed unavailable under the Confrontation
Clause.2 58 A majority of the Supreme Court of California held that
the prosecution had shown due diligence, but a dissenting judge
disagreed and sided with the California Court of Appeal in the
decision below.2 59
This limited sample of appellate rulings suggests that the
California courts take Crawford claims seriously and in good faith.
The Benitez panel reversed,260 as did the appellate court in
Herrera.261  The California courts tend to favor the prosecution if
given doctrinal opportunities, as shown by six of the seven wins
for the State in close cases. Moreover, I did not find any cases in
which the state courts reversed a conviction based on a robustly
pro-defense reading of the Supreme Court cases, even though such
a reading is certainly possible, and was more plausible before the
Bryant decision.
The habeas corpus decisions in federal district court in 2010
are also informative. Of fifty-eight cases, 26 2 only one, Saracoglus
v. Walker, vacated a conviction on Crawford grounds.2 63 In this
case, the victim of domestic violence presented herself at the
police station where she was questioned by police. She bore
visible signs of injury and was clearly upset. The assault took
place half an hour before. 26 The victim did not testify at the
256 Id. at 713.
257 Id
258 Id.
259 Id
260 Benitez, 230 P.3d at 1117.
261 Herrera, 232 P.3d at 713.
262 This number is based on the results of a search of the Westlaw DCTCA database
for "Crawford v. Washington" and "contrary to clearly established" for the year 2010. It
is possible, although extremely unlikely, that a district would rule on a habeas petition
without quoting the AEDPA standard.
263 Saracoglu v. Walker, No. CV 09-2195-VAP (DTB), 2010 U.S. Dist. WL
1169729, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2010).
264 People v. Saracoglu, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 418, 419 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
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trial.26 5 The California Court of Appeal held that the victim's
statements to police were "closer to Davis than to Hammon."26 6
The federal court held that this ruling was "objectively
unreasonable" as required by the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the AEDPA standard. 26 7  This ruling seems entirely correct,
given that in Hammon, the Court characterized the victim's
statements at the scene as testimonial. 268
Saracoglu's victory, however, was Pyrrhic. The Los Angeles
County Court convicted him in August 2005 and sentenced him to
six years in prison.2 69  Federal habeas did not vindicate his
Crawford claim until March 2010.270 In the cases I reviewed,
California prisoners took five or six years to exhaust the state
process and reach federal district court.27'
In many cases, the defendants' Crawford claims were
obviously without merit.27 2  In several cases, however, apparent
Crawford errors did not lead to habeas relief due to the
"objectively unreasonable" standard of review, the harmless error
doctrine, or a combination of the two. 27 3  Habeas review of
265 Id
266 Id. at 427.
267 Saracoglu, at 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 1169729, at *1.
268 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278 (2006).
269 Saracoglu, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 419.
270 Saracoglu, at 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 1169729, at * 1.
271 See infra Appendices I and 2; see, e.g., Saracoglu, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 419
sentencing defendant to state prison for six years).
272 See People v. Minor, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 228, 241 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
273 See Scott v. Mule Creek State Prison, No. ED CV 07-909 SVW (PJW), 2010
WL 5563805, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2010) (holding that the state court decision
prior to Melendez-Diaz, which found a lab report nontestimonial, was not objectively
reasonable given that four justices had dissented in Melendez-Diaz); Motley v. Cate, No.
CIV S-09-1525-CMK-P, 2010 WL 4880662, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2010) (holding
that a state court ruling that a 911 call made five minutes after a shooting, which
described the perpetrator and getaway vehicle was nontestimonial nor contrary to
established Supreme Court precedent); Gilford v. Wong, No. C 09-1774 SI (PR), 2010
WL 3447698, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2010) (agreeing on the merits with the state
court finding that a 911 call describing a getaway vehicle and naming an intruder was
non-testimonial under the ongoing emergency doctrine); Mendoza v. Felker, No. CV 07-
2541-ABC (PJW), 2010 WL 3034658, at *11 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2010) (state court
found Crawford errors but held them harmless; federal court viewed evidence against
defendant as less than "overwhelming" but held state court's decision not objectively
unreasonable); Ford v. Kane, No. CIV S-05-0366 MCE EFB P, 2010 WL 2880150, at
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California Crawford rulings is a genuine, but remote and
improbable prospect. As for direct review in the Supreme Court
of the United States, between the Melendez-Diaz ruling in 2009
and the Bryant ruling in 2011, there was no high court Crawford
decision from any jurisdiction.
My impressions of the California courts' grudging good-faith
in Crawford cases was reinforced by my review of a sample of
100 unreported Crawford cases decided by California appellate
courts in 20 10.274 As explained in Appendix 2, I classified these
cases as follows:
(1) Decisions (5) reversing convictions on Crawford
grounds;
(2) Decisions (43) rejecting Crawford claims where the
ruling was clearly correct;
(3) Decisions (23) rejecting Crawford claims where I
thought reasonable judges could have ruled either way;
(4) Decisions (5) rejecting Crawford claims where the court
was on very doubtful ground; and
(5) Decisions (24) rejecting Crawford claims on procedural
grounds, either harmless error or waiver (the California
courts use the term "forfeiture" but because that term
has some technical applications in confrontation clause
jurisprudence I use the term "waiver").275
The most frequently litigated open texture issue is the reliance
of a testifying expert on records or reports prepared by a different,
non-testifying officer or criminalist. 276 There are twenty-five cases
in which this issue was litigated among the reported and
unreported decisions. Only three-Benitez, Lopez-Garcia, and
*8-10, (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2010) (holding a state court's pre-Davis determination that a
victim's statement to police at the scene was not testimonial was not objectively
unreasonable); Clavano v. Clark, No. EDCV 07-276-SVW (OP), 2010 WL 5826179, at
*14-15 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2010) (holding state court's finding that Crawford errors
were harmless was probably correct, and the holding was not objectively unreasonable).
274 See infra Appendix 2.
275 See infra Appendix 2.
276 See Benitez, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 39.
[Vol. XXXVII380
CRAWFORD IN CALIFORNIA
Schwarz-were reversed.277 While the specific facts of each case
matter, the overall distribution of results is nonetheless suggestive.
On the other hand, I found only five of the unreported cases
downright dubious.27 8 If the state courts are not following the
Supreme Court in only five percent of the sample, the evidence
certainly does not suggest "massive resistance." Mistaken rulings
are inevitable. If, however, five incorrect rulings for the state
sounds like an acceptable error rate, I did not regard any of the
five reversals as highly dubious.
Taken together, the unreported cases support my "grudging
good faith" characterization. The California courts are reluctant,
but not unwilling, to reverse convictions for Crawford errors." A
large number of claims were without merit." In the remaining
cases, the prosecution won the great majority, either because the
courts err on the side of ruling for the state on debatable legal
issues, or resort to procedural default rules to avoid the merits.281
The number of reversals is very similar to the number of
questionable legal rulings for the state.282
V. Aspirational Federalism?
In their classic article, Dialectical Federalism,283 Robert Cover
and Alex Alienikoff point out that the Warren Court relied on the
sanction of nullification-reversing convictions-rather than
imposing damages or injunctions to implement the criminal
procedure revolution.284  They call this remedial strategy a
"redundancy" approach because under the Warren Court's robust
attitude toward federal habeas for state prisoners, defendants got
two bites of the constitutional apple.285 If the defense persuaded
277 Id.; People v. Lopez-Garcia, No. B215308, 2010 WL 3529775 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 13, 2010); People v. Schwarz, No. C059021, 2010 WL 193603 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan.
21, 2010).
278 See infra Appendix 2, § 4.
279 See infra Appendix 2, § 1.
280 See infra Appendix 2, § 2.
281 See infra Appendix 2, §§ 4, 5.
282 Cf infra Appendix 2, § 1 with § 4.
283 Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L. J. 1035 (1977).
284 Id. at 1038-41.
285 Id. at 1045.
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the state court, the Supreme Court had discretion to hear an appeal
by the state, but there was never any jurisdiction in the federal
district courts to hear complaints by prosecutors. 286
Even without the modem exhaustion and deference doctrines,
Cover and Aleinikoff argue that federal habeas was not a one-way,
top-down avenue. 28 7  The Supreme Court could announce
"utopian" rules, such as it did in Gideon v. Wainwright.288 The
state courts, however, held the power initially to find the facts in
particular cases, as well as the opportunity to point out to federal
courts the challenges of prosecuting violent crimes given
intractable resource constraints.2 89 In this model of "dialectical
federalism," the federal courts were expected to learn as well as to
teach.290
Cover and Aleinikoff note a great irony about the Burger
Court's habeas approach. 291  By trimming back on habeas, the
Supreme Court began to reduce its own institutional significance.
In the exclusionary rule and confessions cases, the Burger Court
emphasized the value of truth in adjudication.29 2 In curtailing
habeas jurisdiction, however, the Burger Court gave innocence-
protecting constitutional rules no exception from the procedural
default doctrine.2 93
After Sykes, Teague, and AEDPA, the national government
came close to giving up on redundant enforcement of
constitutional rights in criminal procedure. If the California courts
can only expect the federal district courts to issue one writ a year
in an area as heavily litigated as Crawford, they are largely free of
286 Id. at 1051-52.
287 Id at 1038-39.
288 Cover & Alienikoff, supra note 284, at 1039, 1051; see also Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
289 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 283, at 1052-53.
290 Cf id. at 1036 (noting that "state and federal courts were required both to speak
and listen as equals").
291 See id. at 1086 (noting that "Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist's strong
desire for finality and efficiency in the criminal process is empty without the
identification of values which we wish to pursue efficiently").
292 See id. at 1092-94 (discussing the balance between truth-seeking and truth-
obstructing rights).
293 See id at 1101-02 (quoting that "[diefendant would have to show 'cause' for and
'prejudice' from the procedural default").
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federal court supervision on criminal procedure issues.
Crawford reflects the current Court's view that the Sixth
Amendment protects the reliability of the process by mandating
cross-examination. 294  The scope of the "testimonial hearsay"
category, and the existence vel non of exceptions to the cross-
examination requirement for things such as lab reports and expert
opinions, implicate the accuracy of the trial process. 295 The Court
announced the Crawford doctrine in part because the prior
interpretation invited lower courts to admit testimonial hearsay.2 96
Given the weakness of the federal remedial scheme, the invitation
to courts to admit testimonial hearsay remains despite the doctrinal
change.
Some casual computer searches are illustrative. In the last ten
years, the California courts have taken the opportunity to point out
that Ninth Circuit precedent is not binding in California courts in
sixty different criminal cases.297 If you retrieve Crawford on
Westlaw, there are 498 negative references in the lower courts.298
Some of these are lower federal court decisions, and labels such as
"distinguished" or "declined to extend" do not necessarily mean
that the lower court was reading Crawford in an unfairly narrow
way. Nonetheless, the sheer number of negative citations is
suggestive of the fact that state courts do not always choose to
strictly follow federal court holdings, even those of the Supreme
Court.
If the federal remedial structure is so feeble, and if this
situation is not lost on the lower courts, at least two questions
remain. First, why do Supreme Court decisions favorable to the
accused have as much traction as they do in the state courts?
Second, is there a plausible normative defense of the practice of
announcing unenforceable constitutional rights in the criminal
294 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55-59 (discussing the history and constitutional necessity
of cross-examination).
295 See id at 74 (noting that exceptions to the cross-examination requirement have
been historically allowed in situations where out of court statements are believed to be as
accurate as statements made on cross-examination).
296 See id. at 63-64.
297 See generally People v Jacobs, No. B218505, 2010 wl 3620772 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2010) (conduct a search on Westlaw search of the CA-CS database:
(date after 2000) & ti(people) & ("Ninth Circuit" /s "not binding") (Mar. 20, 2011).
298 Id. (searching the negative history of Crawford)
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process?
The aforementioned "history" tab for Crawford in Westlaw
produced tens of thousands of "positive references."299 Typically
these cases cite Crawford as establishing the doctrinal framework
for analysis.3 00 Courts affirm the conviction as consistent with
Crawford or, alternatively, on the basis of waiver or harmless
error. 30 ' Nonetheless, there is no overt evidence of massive
resistance. Indeed, Crawford's lamentable impact on domestic
violence prosecutions reflects state court readiness to enforce the
cross-examination requirement.302
An illuminating example of grudging acceptance of Crawford
is In re Fernando R. ,303 a 2006 decision of the California Court of
Appeal. 304  The appeal arose from a juvenile court adjudication
where the defendant was found guilty of purse snatching.30 At the
adjudication, the victim did not testify.306 A police officer testified
299 Id. (examining the positive history of Crawford).
300 See, e.g., Chikosi, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (rejecting a
Crawford challenge to police testimony based on alcohol-testing equipment tested by
nontestifying officers); People v. Benitez, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(finding a reversible Crawford error where police lab supervisor testified that a substance
seized from defendant was methamphetamine based on report prepared by non-testifying
analyst); People v. Bowman, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (rejecting a
Crawford challenge to supervisor's testimony that substance seized from defendant was
methamphetamine, based on reports prepared by nontestifying analyst).
301 See infra Appendix 2 (noting the frequent rejection of Crawford claims in
unpublished California Court of Appeal cases on procedural or harmless error grounds);
see, e.g., People v. Johnson, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (finding a
victim's 911 call while driving away from scene of attempted murder was not
testimonial and, thus, admissible under Crawford); People v. Nelson, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d
56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (finding a shooting victim's statement to firefighter in
ambulance en route to hospital naming the defendant as shooter not testimonial).
302 See, e.g., People v. Younger, Al10031, 2010 WL 338962 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29,
2010) (finding victim's statements at scene of pre-homicide domestic battery to be
testimonial and finding no evidence of motive to silence for subsequent homicide that
could support forfeiture by wrongdoing; murder conviction reversed); People v. Painia,
No. B215733, 2010 WL 2473268 (Cal. Ct. App. June 21, 2010) (finding the admission
of preliminary hearing testimony at domestic battery trial was a reversible Crawford
error because the prosecutor did not make an adequate showing of due diligence in
locating the witness).
303 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
304 Id
305 Id. at 64.
306 Id.
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to the victim's account made to the officer during a field
interview.307
The court began by expressing some candid skepticism about
Crawford:
Since March 2004, courts across the country have attempted to
apply the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Crawford v. Washington in thousands of cases potentially
implicating the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation....
The late Chief Justice Rehnquist lamented (prophetically) that
the court's decision "casts a mantle of uncertainty over future
[federal and state] criminal trials" and that the majority's
reluctance to define "testimonial" left federal and state
prosecutors temporarily without answers as to what types of
statements would be deemed "testimonial" under the new rule
announced in Crawford.30 s
With such an opening bow to the minority opinion in
Crawford, one might expect a decision for the State. Instead, the
opinion fended off a plausible claim of procedural default then
carefully analyzed the facts to determine whether the hearsay at
issue was the product of "police interrogation" within Crawford's
"testimonial" taxonomy.3 0 9  Finding the statements to be
testimonial, the Fernando R. court held the error not harmless and
reversed.310
Despite skepticism about Supreme Court doctrine and practical
impunity to subvert it, there is a substantial degree of state court
fidelity to the High Court's rulings.3 11 One plausible reason for
this is simply the professional socialization of judges. Another
reason may be more particularly American: the prestige, at least
within the legal profession, of the Supreme Court. I suspect,
307 Id at 65.
308 In re Fernando R., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 63.
309 Id. at 72-73.
310 Id. at 79-80.
3 11 See, e.g., Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 283, at 1057-59 (examining the strong
deference of the Wisconsin Supreme Court to the holdings of the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals "in the interest of the harmonious ordering of federal-state court relations").
312 See, e.g., Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 283, at 1054 (explaining that Supreme
Court decisions set an agenda for the inferior federal courts and the state courts by
3852011]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
that some of the explanation for compliance with Supreme Court
doctrine is the frequency with which constitutional error at trial
can be excused on appeal as waived or harmless.
Thus, the normative question is at least partly linked to
descriptive questions about criminal procedure. The practically
weak federal remedial power raises fairly obvious rule-of-law and
human rights concerns.' If Crawford is right, an important trial
safeguard is at risk in state courts because the remedial scheme is
so weak. When a federal habeas court concludes that a state
decision was mistaken but must stand under the AEDPA, the
federal court essentially enters a judgment that the court regards as
an unconstitutional judgment.3 14 What might be said on the other
side of the scales?
Three possible values come to mind. The first is finality.
When courts disagree about how to apply Supreme Court doctrine,
reversal of a verdict five or ten years after the trial will impose
serious costs on the state."'1 A retrial may not be possible. There
is a nontrivial chance that the first trial reached a just, if
procedurally flawed, result, which will be made nugatory by an
insistence on procedural perfection. Even if retrial is possible,
providing two trials in one case, when systemic pressures cause
nine in ten defendants to forgo trial altogether, is a costly decision.
The second value promoted by the distinctly limited remedial
scheme is case sensitivity. Strictly speaking, the Confrontation
Clause, like most constitutional procedural rights, is trans-
designating issues and values of particular concern).
313 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 930 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (if courts "lose their resolve . .. and give to the seductive all of expediency . .
. the vital guarantees of the Fourth Amendment are reduced to nothing more than 'a form
of words'.") (citation omitted).
314 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 376-77 (2000) (explaining that if federal
courts could only grant habeas relief in situations where the state court's ruling was
objectively unreasonable, as was suggested by the holding of the Fourth Circuit, the
effect "would wrongly require the federal courts, including this Court, to defer to state
judges' interpretations of federal law").
315 See Hoffmann & King, supra note 128, at 849 n.93 (2009) (quoting the Senate
Judiciary Committee testimony of Ronald Eisenberg, Deputy District Attorney,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: "The truth is that, whether or not they end up reversing a
conviction, federal habeas courts drag out litigation for years of utterly unjustifiable
delay, creating exorbitant costs for the state.").
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substantive.3 16 The Clause applies to "all criminal prosecutions"
for crimes as disparate as soliciting prostitution and aggravated
murder.3 17 Yet, it is rational to regard the release of an apparently
guilty drug user with more equanimity than the release of an
apparently guilty murderer.
The Supreme Court itself is not beyond this temptation. In
People v. Geier,"'1 the California Supreme Court rejected a
Crawford challenge to the introduction of the report of an
inculpatory DNA test.319 A technician who did not testify at the
trial had performed the test and prepared the report. Geier held
the report not testimonial.320 For the Geier court, the "crucial
point [was] whether the statement represent[ed] the
contemporaneous recordation of observable events.""' The
Supreme Court later rejected this distinction in Melendez-Diaz.3 22
Geier's petition for certiorari was pending when Melendez-
Diaz came down.323 From a purely technical point of view, the
Court should have vacated Geier's conviction and remanded it for
reconsideration in light of Melendez-Diaz. Instead, the High Court
denied the petition, leaving Geier to pursue habeas corpus.3 2 4
Melendez-Diaz applies to his case because certiorari was not
denied until a few days after the Court decided Melendez-Diaz.32 5
If the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, Melendez-Diaz
would apply with full force. For Geier's habeas petition, however,
316 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, O.1 Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive
Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 847 (2001) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment is transsubstantive, and thus, in theory, applies the same way across a
variety of criminal cases).
317 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 2.
318 People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (Cal. 2007).
319 Id. at 131.
320 Id. at 140.
321 Id.
322 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542 (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not
permit a criminal prosecutor to use "ex parte out-of-court affidavits" in order to prove
the case, thereby expanding the Crawford doctrine to preclude the use of state laboratory
reports where the analysts did not testify in court).
323 Geier v. California, 129 S. Ct. 2856 (2009).
324 Id. at 2856.
325 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527, was decided on June 25, 2009. Certiorari was
denied for Geier, 129 S. Ct. 2856, on June 29, 2009.
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the standard of review is whether the California court was
objectively unreasonable in taking a position similar to the
position taken by the four dissenting justices in Melendez-Diaz.2 6
We can only speculate about denials of certiorari. Geier stood
convicted of rape and multiple homicides on the basis of DNA
evidence.32 7 Apparently compelling evidence of egregious
culpability may have played a role in the Court's decision.
Likewise, the recent decision in Bryant might have taken a
narrower view of the "ongoing emergency" doctrine if facts of the
case involved domestic battery, like Davis and Hammon, rather
than low-level drug dealing, as in Melendez-Diaz.32 8
When the Supreme Court itself adjusts the doctrine to sustain a
murder conviction, as in Bryant, the new doctrine has general
effect.3 29 By contrast, when a state court works overtime to find
waiver, harmless error, or "nontestimonial hearsay," the tension
with rule of law values is more locally confined.330 Reversals on
Crawford grounds were more likely to occur in relatively minor
cases. In Fernando R., the issue was a delinquency adjudication
326 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2010) (establishing the standard of review for a writ of
habeas corpus).
327 Geier, 161 P.3d at 110.
328 Cf Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1147 (2011) (holding out-of-court
"identification and description of the shooter and the location of the shooting were not
testimonial statements because they had a 'primary purpose . . . to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency') and Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2268 (holding
witness statements are not testimonial, and therefore may be used in court, if the
"primary purpose of interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency"), with Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542 (holding drug purity evidence
against a defendant could not be admitted because the lab analyst was not in court).
329 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that in creating a
substantial exception to the Confrontation Clause in Bryant, the Court "distorts our
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in a [sic] shambles").
330 See, e.g., People v. Redd, 229 P.3d 101, 136 (Cal. 2010) (finding that the
defendant waived a Crawford objection to admission of pre-trial identifications by
eyewitnesses who testified at trial because the objection was not raised at the initial
trial); People v. Molina, No. B210718, 2010 WL 60127 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2010)
(holding that post-crime statements to police reporting suspect's vehicle's license plate
number were not testimonial because statements were spontaneous and informal); People
v. Rincon, No. B217776, 2010 WL 4355584 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2010) (finding that a
police officer is permitted to testify on an anonymous neighbor's statements that the
neighbor had witnessed an apparent drug sale. This anonymous statement was the basis
of officer's expert opinion issue of whether drugs were possessed by defendant for sale).
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for unarmed robbery.3 3' In the only habeas case won by a
California prisoner under Crawford in 20 10,332 defendant
Saracoglu was given six years for battery, his sentence being
enhanced for prior offenses. 333  He won his case five years after
conviction.
My sample of California cases included six convictions
reversed on Crawford grounds: Benitez and Schwarz were drug
prosecutions; 334 Painia was a domestic battery prosecution;3 5
Lopez-Garcia was a prosecution for serial rape, but the reversal on
Crawford grounds threw out only five of nine counts of
conviction; 36 Younger was a murder case litigated by the State on
the theory of reflexive forfeiture.337
When the Supreme Court threw out that theory in Giles, the
prosecution had little left to work with in its third trip to the
California Court of Appeal. 3 Ruiz was also a murder case, but
the confrontation error was relatively clear. Murder convictions,
whether punctuated by a sentence of death or of life imprisonment,
are also virtually certain to call forth a substantial petition for
331 See In re Fernando R., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 63-64 (2006).
332 See Saracoglu v. Walker, No. CV 09-2195-VAP(DTB), WL 1169729 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 23, 2010).
333 People v. Saracoglu, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 418 (2007).
334 Benitez, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 42 (finding a reversible Crawford error where
police lab supervisor testified that, based on report prepared by non-testifying analyst,
the substance seized from defendant was methamphetamine); People v. Schwarz, No.
C059021, 2010 WL 193603 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2010) (reversing a drug conviction
based on testimony by an analyst who did not actually perform the lab test showing
substance was controlled substance).
335 People v. Painia, No. B215733, 2010 WL 2473268 (Cal. Ct. App. June 21, 2010)
(holding admission of preliminary hearing testimony at a domestic battery trial without
adequate showing of due diligence by prosecution in locating the witness was reversible
Crawford error).
336 People v. Lopez-Garcia, No. B215308, 2010 WL 3529775 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept.
13, 2010) (holding a laboratory report of DNA test testimonial, requiring reversal of five
of nine counts of conviction for sexual assault).
337 People v. Younger, No. Al 10031, 2010 WL 338962 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29,
2010) (finding victim's statements at scene of pre-homicide domestic battery to be
testimonial and finding no evidence of motive to silence for subsequent homicide that
could support forfeiture by wrongdoing; murder conviction reversed).
338 See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 353 (2008) (holding the theory that the
accused forfeits his right to cross-examine witnesses against him because of his
wrongdoing is not a legitimate exception to the Sixth Amendment).
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federal habeas.33 9 The reversals in the sample support the
proposition that the California courts are aware of the specific
circumstances of each case, and reversal typically is accompanied
by some comforting sense that a ruling for the defense either did
little insult to substantial justice or would be required in due time
by the federal courts.
Case-sensitivity suggests a third value that might be served by
the announcement of practically unenforceable rights: the
articulation of broader individual rights than society is prepared to
accept in practice. Knowledge that a "utopian" rights declaration
will not have catastrophic practical consequences encourages such
Supreme Court declarations because lower courts will avoid the
consequences by resorting to waiver, harmless error, and
borderline interpretations shielded by the AEDPA.3 40 As Gideon
suggests,3 4 1 it may be better for the Supreme Court to declare an
ideal that takes decades to fulfill than to have the Court confine
itself to rights declarations it can implement directly.
I offer no fixed opinion as to whether finality, case-sensitivity,
and articulation values justify AEDPA's deference standard.
These values are served by the current habeas regime without
wholly abandoning national enforcement of constitutional rights in
state cases. The Court's rendering of AEDPA's actual language
into the "objectively unreasonable" form retains more power of
federal review than the face of the statute might suggest. 34 2 As
divisions on the Court about how to apply "objectively
reasonable" suggest, 343 the standard is fairly plastic.
339 People v. Ruiz, No. B209622, 2010 WL 1463149 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2010)
(codefendant's confession to police held testimonial and redaction held inadequate to
eliminate incrimination of non-confessing codefendants; murder convictions reversed).
340 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 283, at 1053 (noting that "[s]ince the federal
court lacks administrative supervisory power over the state courts, and since the political
constituencies of the two courts are largely distinct, the reformative strategy of the
Utopian [federal] court can be effectively blocked by state court non-acceptance of a
new constitutional rule.").
341 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel as a fundamental right for all individuals accused of a crime
regardless of their ability to pay for the representation).
342 See Williams, 529 U.S. at 365 (announcing "the federal court should ask whether
the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively
unreasonable").
343 See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 404-05 (2005) (Kennedy, J.,
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In Williams v. Taylor,3 44 the source of the "objectively
unreasonable" reading of AEDPA, four justices would have gone
further and held Section 2254(d)'s contrary-to-established-
precedent provision merely hortatory.345 If a majority suspects that
their rulings are subverted behind the shield of deference, they
might revisit the issue and return to a regime without deference.
The Court thus retains, without statutory amendment or a
constitutional ruling, the option of reinvigorating federal habeas
review if the Justices sense that their rulings are not substantially
followed.3 4 6 The Justices also retain the power to greatly increase
the number of cases they take on direct review.
Eliminating noncapital habeas would advance finality values
and reduce litigation costs without further diluting the exceedingly
limited federal review power.3 48 Statutory abolition of the
noncapital habeas jurisdiction would eliminate the prospect that
the Supreme Court could, by statutory interpretation, return the
habeas standard more or less to where it stood before AEDPA.3 49
Abolishing noncapital habeas also threatens articulation
values. One source of the Supreme Court's criminal procedure
caseload consists of appeals from decisions denying, or granting,
habeas relief to state prisoners.3 50 If that jurisdiction were
dissenting) (accusing majority of paying only "lip service" to the "objectively
unreasonable" Williams standard).
344 529 U.S. 362 (2000)
345 See id. at 389 (opinion of Stevens, J.) ("In sum, the statute directs federal courts
to attend to every state-court judgment with utmost care, but it does not require them to
defer to the opinion of every reasonable state-court judge on the content of federal.
law.").
346 Id. (noting that the independent judgment of a federal court on questions of
federal law should prevail).
347 See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2010) (establishing the Court's broad authority to review
cases by writ of certiorari).
348 See Hoffmann & King, supra note 128, at 82-83 (2009).
349 See id. at 840 (noting "only four narrow avenues of federal judicial review of
noncapital state criminal cases would remain" if the author's suggestion of limiting
habeas claims was undertaken).
350 See generally Habeas Relieffor State Prisoners, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM.
PROC. 805, 872 (2008) (discussing the legislative and procedural background for the writ
of habeas corpus); Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Complex Procedure
for A Simple Process, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1015 (1993) (discussing history of the writ's use
in American jurisprudence and the Sisyphean task of pursuing federal habeas review as it
relates to the death penalty).
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confined to capital cases, the Court would decide more cases of
egregious culpability than otherwise. Such a change would add
corresponding practical pressure to affirm convictions, pressures
that could exert perverse influence on doctrinal evolution.
VI. Conclusion: Reach and Grasp in Criminal
Procedure
The Supreme Court's reach exceeds its grasp in the criminal
procedure field."' Although the Court holds final responsibility
for declaring the meaning of the Bill of Rights, it lacks practical
power to compel state compliance with constitutional rulings such
as Crawford. Nonetheless, there is a substantial amount of
compliance with Crawford despite this remedial weakness.352 At
the margins, some state courts give Crawford narrow application
and look for procedural opportunities to avoid reversal when a
finding of Crawford error is ineluctable."'
Announcing unenforceable rights compromises the rights
announced (in this instance, confrontation) and rule of law values.
However, announcing such rights also advances finality, case-
sensitivity, and articulation values.354 Without advancing a strong
view on how to sort out the conflict among these values, my hope
is that explaining these values in the context of the U.S.
experience may help not only American lawyers pondering the
mysteries of the federal habeas practice, but also an international
audience that regularly faces the same typology of rights in the
351 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 283, at 1053 (noting that "the reformative
strategy of the Utopian court can be effectively blocked by state court non-acceptance of
a new constitutional rule.").
352 See Westlaw search, supra note 299 (noting positive applications of the
Crawford decision in state courts).
353 See, e.g., People v. Miller, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 629 (Cal. App. 2010) (rejecting
Crawford challenge to DNA expert's testimony based on reports of non-testifying
analyst); People v. Minor, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (holding Crawford
inapplicable in proceeding to extend period of probation).
354 Cf Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women's Equality, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 735, 759-60 (2002) (noting that "American judges tend to view positive rights as
unenforceable; . . . proclaiming unenforceable rights might well dilute popular respect
for other constitutional provisions."); Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the
Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 441, 453 (2004) ("Judicially
unenforceable rights can have real world consequences if enforced by the political
branches.").
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criminal process that are declared by a central authority but
implemented (or not) by substantially autonomous local systems.
Appendix 1: 2010 Reported California Crawford Cases
People v. Johnson, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(victim's 911 call while driving away from scene of attempted
murder were nontestimonial)
People v. Nelson, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(shooting victim's statement to firefighter in an ambulance while
en route to hospital naming defendant as shooter was
nontestimonial)
People v. Redd, 229 P.3d 101 (Cal. 2010) (defendant waived
Crawford objection to admission of pre-trial identifications by
eyewitnesses who testified at trial and concluding the objection
was without merit)
People v. Cowan, 236 P.3d 1074 (Cal. 2010) (rejecting Crawford
claim regarding declarant who testified at trial)
People v. Hollinquest, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(holding declarant validly claimed Fifth Amendment privilege and
was consequently deemed unavailable and concluding the
opportunity for cross-examination at the preliminary hearing was
adequate despite lack of complete discovery at that time)
People v. Chikosi, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(rejecting Crawford challenge to police testimony based on
alcohol-testing equipment tested by non-testifying officers, review
granted, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 62 (Cal. Aug. 11, 2010))
People v. Benitez, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(finding reversible Crawford error where police lab supervisor
testified based on a report prepared by a non-testifying analyst that
a substance seized from defendant was methamphetamine, review
granted, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 329 (Cal. May 12, 2010))
3932011]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
People v. Bowman, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(rejecting Crawford challenge to supervisor's testimony that a
substance seized from defendant was methamphetamine when this
testimony was based on reports prepared by non-testifying analyst,
review granted, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 611 (Cal. June 9, 2010))
People v. Navarrete, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(reversing on other grounds and not passing on defendant's
Crawford claim, review granted, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 614 (Cal. Nov.
10, 2010))
People v. Miller, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(rejecting Crawford challenge to DNA expert's testimony based
on reports of a non-testifying analyst)
People v. Herrera, 232 P.3d 710 (Cal. 2010) (finding the state had
exercised due diligence in attempting to secure attendance of a
preliminary hearing witness at trial and therefore reversing the
appellate decision and reinstating defendant's conviction)
People v. Minor, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(holding Crawford inapplicable in a proceeding to extend the
period of probation)
People v. D'Arcy, 226 P.3d 949 (Cal. 2010) (rejecting Crawford
challenge to admission of a dying declaration)
People v. Lynch, 237 P.3d 416 (Cal. 2010) (holding conversation
between victim and victim's mother in hospital was
nontestimonial absent record evidence of police participation in
the conversation)
People v. Jennings, 237 P.3d 474 (Cal. 2010) (declining to reach
merits of Crawford claim and finding any error harmless)
People v. Letner, 235 P.3d 62 (Cal. 2010) (holding letters between
defendants and an associate were nontestimonial hearsay)
Appendix 11: A Sample of 100 Unreported California Cases
Applying Crawford in 2010
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A search in the Westlaw California Cases database for "date(2010)
and Crawford v. Washington" returned 204 results. I focused on
the first 100 of these results not otherwise discussed in this article
and in which a genuine Crawford issue was present. Cases in
which the defense did not assert a Crawford violation were
excluded. The remaining 100 California Court of Appeal
decisions applying Crawford were then sorted into five groups:
(1) Decisions (5) reversing convictions on Crawford
grounds;
(2) Decisions (43) rejecting Crawford claims where the
ruling was clearly correct;
(3) Decisions (23) rejecting Crawford claims where
reasonable judges could have ruled either way;
(4) Decisions (5) rejecting Crawford claims where the
court was on very doubtful ground; and
(5) Decisions (24) rejecting Crawford claims on
procedural grounds, either harmless error or waiver
(the California courts use the term "forfeiture" but
because that term has some technical applications in
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, I use the term
"waiver").
Because many cases state alternative grounds for rejecting the
defendant's claim, I was often not entirely sure whether to place
some cases in category 5 or not. In the end, I included those cases
where, because the procedural ruling received the most emphasis
or the merits ruling was relatively weak, I thought the primary
ground of decision was procedural. Likewise, cases where a
procedural ground was given but the primary emphasis was on the
merits were included in categories 2 and 3.
The usual caveats apply. I expect many evidence specialists
would disagree with at least some of my characterizations.
Nonetheless I think the overall picture survives the possibility that
my views of some of the cases in the sample are eccentric. I re-
emphasize that, as of the time of these decisions, the U.S. Supreme
Court had not handed down Bryant.
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By far the largest number of "close call" affirmances concerned
expert testimony including or based on statements or reports by
declarants who did not testify at the trial. There were twenty-one
such cases. The defense won only three of these. The issues are
murky enough that the California Supreme Court has granted
review in a substantial number of cases raising issues under
Melendez-Diaz... and Geier.356 In one of these expert-basis cases,
People v. Rincon,3' the court approved qualifying a police officer
as an expert on drug dealing and permitted the officer to testify
that an anonymous neighbor reported having seen apparent drug
sales out of the defendant's home as the basis of the expert's
opinion. The hearsay aspect of the testimony so dominates the
basis-of-opinion aspect in this instance that, granting the legal
plausibility of the expert's-basis theory, I have classified the ruling
as "dubious" rather than "close call."
Category 1: Cases Finding Reversible Crawford Error
People v. Lopez-Garcia, No. B215308, 2010 WL 3529775 (Cal.
Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2010) (holding laboratory report of a DNA test
was testimonial and reversing five of nine counts of conviction for
sexual assault)
People v. Painia, No. B215733, 2010 WL 2473268 (Cal. Ct. App.
June 21, 2010) (admission of preliminary hearing testimony
domestic battery trial was reversible Crawford error where there
was not an adequate showing of due diligence by the prosecution
to locate the witness)
People v. Younger, No. Al 10031, 2010 WL 338962 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 29, 2010) (finding victim's statements at scene of pre-
homicide domestic battery to be testimonial, finding no evidence
of motive to silence for subsequent homicide that could support
forfeiture by wrongdoing, and reversing conviction for murder)
355 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
356 Geier v. California, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 580, 621-22 (Cal. 2007).
357 People v. Rincon, No. B217776, 2010 wl 4355584 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2010).
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People v. Ruiz, No. B209622, 2010 WL 1463149 (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 14, 2010) (codefendant's confession to police was testimonial
and redaction of the confession was inadequate to eliminate
incrimination of non-confessing codefendants)
People v. Schwarz, No. C059021, 2010 WL 193603 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 21, 2010) (reversing drug count conviction based on
testimony by an analyst other than the analyst who performed the
lab test showing substance was controlled substance)
Category 2: Cases Rejecting Crawford Claims on the Merits
Where the Ruling Was Clearly Correct
People v. Garcia, No. E048866, 2010 WL 3442045 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 2, 2010) (no Crawford violation found where a prosecutor
was permitted to ask questions a contumacious witness would
refuse to answer)
In re J.C., No. C061444, 2010 WL 1691429 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr.
28, 2010) (holding DMV records made before an alleged offense
were nontestimonial)
People v. Ajaj, No. B215090, 2010 WL 1966189 (Cal. Ct. App.
May 18, 2010) (rejecting application of Crawford to probation
revocation proceedings)
People v. Campbell, No. A126441, 2010 WL 828112 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 10, 2010) (rejecting Crawford claim in probation
revocation proceeding)
People v. King, No. B213358, 2010 WL 2016181 (Cal. Ct. App.
May 21, 2010) (where doctors A and B were both present at an
autopsy, A's use of B's report to refresh A's recollection when B
did not testify was nontestimonial hearsay)
People v. Zuinga, No. B213630, 2010 WL 1472690 (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 14, 2010) (surreptitiously recorded conversation between two
of defendants' codefendants was nontestimonial)
People v. Phongboupha, No. A122830, 2010 WL 3180271 (Cal.
Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2010) (Defendant conceded declarant's
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statement was not testimonial; due process objection to
nontestimonial hearsay rejected)
People v. Acuna, No. B215134, 2010 WL 2816802 (Cal. Ct. App.
July 20, 2010) (finding that the prosecution had exercised due
diligence in attempting to secure the appearance of a witness
before introducing preliminary hearing testimony)
People v. Carter, No. B212502, 2010 WL 4678904 (Cal. Ct. App.
Nov. 19, 2010) ("memory loss by trial witness did not deprive
defendant of cross-examination")
People v. Chaidez, 2d Crim. No. B209623, 2010 WL 2028500
(Cal. Ct. App. May 24, 2010) (murder victim's statement to
victim's girlfriend two weeks before the murder was
nontestimonial)
People v. Flint, No. B205374, 2010 WL 2654637 (Cal. Ct. App.
July 6, 2010) (that defendant's adoptive admissions in
conversation with friends were nontestimonial)
People v. Tuuamaelemalo, No. B209898, 2010 WL 4983266 (Cal.
Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to testimony
by physician who observed entire autopsy when a junior doctor
performed the actual operations)
People v. Wiley, No. F057133, 2010 WL 1803383 (Cal. Ct. App.
May 24, 2010) (rejecting Crawford objection to the testimony of
declarant's out-of-court statements because declarant testified at
trial)
People v. Vu Thanh Van Le, No. G042343, 2010 WL 4263727
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2010) (holding court records of prior
convictions nontestimonial)
In re X.T., No. A127627, 2010 WL 3349225 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug.
26, 2010) (holding Crawford inapplicable in juvenile probation
revocation proceedings)
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In re Fernando L., No. A 127795 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2010)
(holding 911 call made during armed burglary was nontestimonial
and admission of testimonial accomplice's statements during
interrogation was proper because accomplice was subject to cross-
examination at trial)
People v. Tellez, No. B211610, 2010 WL 310780 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 28, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge because declarant
testified; harmless error alternate holding)
People v. Burnett, 2d Crim. No. B217704, 2010 WL 3769244
(Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to
admission of preliminary hearing testimony where evidence
showed due diligence in attempting to secure attendance of
witness at trial; harmless error alternative holding)
People v. Thongdeng, No. G041766, 2010 WL 2933666 (Cal. Ct.
App. July 28, 2010) (following California Supreme Court
precedent to hold a dying declaration admissible)
People v. Banks, No. B216066, 2010 WL 1463192 (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 14, 2010) (holding written communications between
accomplices were not testimonial)
People v. Muesse, No. G042887, 2010 WL 4546664 (Cal. Ct.
App. Nov. 12, 2010) (where 911 call by non-testifying bystander
was made during an attack on a victim, the call fell under Davis3 11
rather than Hammon"s9)
People v. Magallanes, No. G042271, 2010 WL 703213 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 1, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to a statement
not offered for the truth)
People v. Wallace, No. A 124229, 2010 WL 3295984 (Cal. Ct.
App. Aug. 23, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to the use of
court records to prove prior convictions)
358 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
359 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
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People v. Chavez, No. B216956, 2010 WL 3548467 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 14, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to admission of
statements not offered for their truth; waiver of objection
alternative holding)
In re Kristen Y., No. A128206, 2010 WL 4636711 (Cal. Ct. App.
Nov. 17, 2010) (rejecting Crawford claim in juvenile probation
revocation proceeding)
People v. Perez, No. B211325, 2010 WL 1509798 (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 16, 2010) (holding accomplice's statements to undercover
informant were nontestimonial)
In re T.G., No. A 126454, 2010 WL 3898052 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 6,
2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge where declarant testified at
trial)
People v. Iniquez, No. B216516, 2010 WL 3128758 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 10, 2010) (letter from one gangster to another was
nontestimonial)
People v. Paschal, 2d Crim. No. B213495, 2010 WL 3007501
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2010) (holding defendant had adequate
opportunity to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing when the
witness was unavailable at trial)
People v. Wilson, No. A 19963, 2010 WL 2126726 (Cal. Ct. App.
May 27, 2010) (where the jury was instructed to consider a
testifying witness's conclusory statement identifying defendant as
shooter only if the jury found witness had seen the shooting, the
statement was not testimonial hearsay, nor was it hearsay at all)
People v. Madera, No. B213628, 2010 WL 1951136 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 17, 2010) (where officer testified that defendant stated
perpetrator had worn a bandana, eyewitnesses had described the
assailant as wearing a bandana, and two eyewitnesses testified at
trial that the assailant wore a bandana, no Crawford violation in
officer's testimony)
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People v. Chubbs, No. H033510, 2010 WL 1328626 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 6, 2010) (rejecting Crawford claim in probation
revocation proceeding)
People v. Perez, No. B209761, 2010 WL 60125 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 11, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to admission of
adoptive admissions)
People v. Jujan, No. B216790, 2010 WL 4760427 (Cal. Ct. App.
Nov. 24, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to admission of
letters from other gangsters when not offered for the truth and not
testimonial)
People v. Davalos, 2d Crim. No. B213887, 2010 WL 310987 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2010) (rejecting Crawford claim in probation
revocation proceeding)
People v. Sepulveda, No. B215316, 2010 WL 2089986 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 26, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to admission
of tape-recorded statement to police when declarant testified at
trial)
People v. Wheeler, No. C059987, 2010 WL 4630866 (Cal. Ct.
App. Nov. 17, 2010) (accusations of prior, uncharged misconduct
offered to explain the actions of security guards in focusing on
defendant consistent with Crawford because not offered for truth'
error on other grounds in admitting the evidence, but error held
harmless)
People v. Cooper, No. C061614, 2010 WL 3620343 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 20, 2010) (rejecting Crawford objection to proof of prior
incarceration by introduction of "prison packet" documentation;
general prison records held not testimonial)
People v. Garcia, No. B212638, 2010 WL 2762805 (Cal. Ct. App.
July 14, 2010) (statements made to undercover informant were not
testimonial)
People v. Carroll, 2d Crim. No. B215478, 2010 WL 4108458
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2010) (when psychologist testified as an
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expert about victim's mental condition and relied on a report
prepared years earlier by another mental health professional to
assess the victim's eligibility for government benefits, prior report
held not testimonial hearsay)
People v. Adame, 2d Crim. No. B213536, 2010 WL 4631156 (Cal.
Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2010) (recorded conversation among jailed
suspects was not testimonial; harmless error alternative holding)
People v. Hess, No. B212089, 2010 WL 1294481 (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 6, 2010) (statement of bank employee to agent of another
financial institution that checks the defendant attempted to cash
were "not ok" held not testimonial)
People v. Santana, No. C060202, 2010 WL 2336530 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 10, 2010) (accomplice's statements to accomplice's
girlfriend were not testimonial; harmless error alternative holding)
Category 3: Cases Rejecting Crawford Claims on the Merits
Where Reasonable Judges Might Disagree
People v. Hansen, No. C061610, 2010 WL 3965821 (Cal. Ct.
App. Oct. 12, 2010) (a close factual issue whether a statement
made after a prison fight fell under Davis3 6 o or under Hammon3 6 1)
People v. Gutierez, No. B213488, 2010 WL 189793 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 21, 2010) (permitting expert DNA testimony based on
sample-collection reports prepared by nurses who did not testify)
People v. Mundell, 2d Crim. No. B215133, 2010 WL 1053612
(Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2010) (rejecting claim that a police expert
on gangs had used court records as the basis for opining that a
gang was violent and finding this nontestimonial)
People v. Hull, No. C062239, 2010 WL 3231500 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 17, 2010) (blood-test expert's opinion based on lab reports
360 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
361 829 N.E. 2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
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by non-testifying analysts were found not to be testimonial
hearsay under Crawford)
People v. Green, No. B213820, 2010 WL 822583 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 11, 2010) (expert testimony about whether a substance was
an illegal drug based on notes of tests performed by a non-
testifying analyst was not testimonial hearsay)
People v. Cabrera, No. B215543, 2010 WL 3586531 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 16, 2010) (police expert on gangs testified based on
warnings issued by sheriffs department that defendant's gang's
leaders had issued orders to attack African-Americans)
People v. Zayas, No. E048865, 2010 WL 3530426 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 13, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to expert testimony
based on lab reports prepared by non-testifying analyst)
People v. Medel, No. E049106, 2010 WL 4102303 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 19, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to expert testimony
based on lab reports prepared by non-testifying analyst)
People v. Davis, No. B210006, 2010 WL 1544655 (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 20, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to DNA expert's
testimony based on reports prepared by non-testifying analyst)
People v. Suen, No. B208155, 2010 WL 4401796 (Cal. Ct. App.
Nov. 8, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to DNA expert's
testimony based on reports prepared by non-testifying analyst)
People v. Valencia, No. B218689, 2010 WL 3245807 (Cal. Ct.
App. Aug. 18, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to gang
expert's testimony based on police reports made by non-testifying
officers)
People v. Chea, No. B219274, 2010 WL 3735686 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 27, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to expert testimony
based on autopsy prepared by non-testifying medical examiner;
alternative holding harmless error)
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People v. Williams, No. B215248, 2010 WL 1693933 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 28, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to testimony
by supervisory criminalist about report prepared by non-testifying
analyst)
In re T.F., No. B214260, 2010 WL 926069 (Cal. Ct. App Mar. 16,
2010.) (rejecting Crawford challenge to expert testimony based on
controlled-substance report prepared by non-testifying analyst)
In re F.M., No. C060411, 2010 WL 20991 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 5,
2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to gang expert's testimony
based on reports of non-testifying officers)
People v. True, No. A121975, 2010 WL 1553770 (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 20, 2010) (defendant, charged with possessing stolen vehicle,
claimed he had purchased in good faith from Jon Davis in
southern Oregon; officer testified that multiple interviewees told
him they had never heard of Jon Davis; statements to officer held
not testimonial)
People v. Palma, No. D053833, 2010 WL 1042268 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 23, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to gang expert's
opinion)
People v. Horn, No. D046984, 2010 WL 1138836 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 26, 2010) (rejecting CrawJord challenge to DNA expert
testimony based on lab reports prepared by non-testifying analyst)
People v. Bojorques, No. B21930, 2010 WL 3751775 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 28, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to DNA expert
testimony based on lab reports prepared by non-testifying
analysts)
People v. McKiernan, No. D055374, 2010 WL 3609173 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 17, 2010) (officer's testimony about defendant's BAC
based on machine calibrated and tested by non-testifying officers
held not testimonial)
People v. Nguyen, No. G040190, 2010 WL 1218729 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 30, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to gang
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expert's opinion, based on statements from non-testifying
declarants, that a shooting was gang-related)
People v. Quezada, No. B208928, 2010 WL 2203769 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 3, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to DNA
expert's testimony based on lab reports of non-testifying analyst)
People v. Williams, No. B212342, 2010 WL 1408996 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 9, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to DNA expert
testimony based on lab report prepared by non-testifying analyst)
Category 4: Cases Rejecting Crawford Claims on Doubtful
Grounds
People v. Parham, No. B220633, 2010 WL 5311779 (Cal. Ct.
App. Dec. 28, 2010) (written note describing getaway car and
recording its license plate number handed to police more than an
hour after the crime, held nontestimonial)
People v. Turner, No. B217871, 2010 WL 5311709 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 28, 2010) (Parham's codefendant raised and lost the same
Crawford claim as his codefendant)
People v. Perez, No. B211006, 2010 WL 367469 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 3, 2010) (recording of 911 call describing a vehicle forty
minutes after the crime held not testimonial)
People v. Molina, No. B210718, 2010 WL 60127 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 11, 2010) (post-crime statements to police reporting a
suspect's vehicle's license plate number held not testimonial
because the statements were spontaneous and informal)
People v. Rincon, No. B217776, 2010 WL 4355584 (Cal. Ct. App.
Nov. 4, 2010) (on issue of whether drugs were possessed by
defendant for sale, officer was permitted to testify to an
anonymous neighbor's statements that the neighbor had seen
apparent drug sale and use this as the basis of the officer's expert
opinion)
4052011]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Category 5: Cases Affirming Convictions Exclusively or Primarily
because Defendant Waived the Claim or because Any Error Was
Harmless
People v. Marlow, No. G041710, 2010 WL 2332967 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 10, 2010) (if computerized record of 911 call was
testimonial, any error was harmless)
People v. Madrid, No. B214013, 2010 WL 3245775 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 18, 2010) (holding that post-robbery 911 call was not
testimonial; harmless error is alternative ground)
People v. Colon, No. F056334, 2010 WL 612245 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 22, 2010) (rejecting Crawford challenge to trial testimony by
lab supervisor based on tests performed by non-testifying analyst;
waiver given as alternative ground)
People v. Anguiano, No. B215698, 2010 WL 2839989 (Cal. Ct.
App. July 21, 2010) (admissibility of police record was harmless
error)
People v. Mosqueda, No. C059252, 2010 WL 424974 (Cal. Ct.
App. Feb. 8, 2010) (assuming, without deciding that admission of
undercover informants' recorded statements were testimonial
hearsay, any error held harmless)
People v. Ayala, No. B216952, 2010 WL 5175463 (Cal. Ct. App.
Def. 22, 2010) (holding multiple Crawford violations were either
waived or harmless)
People v. Chavez, No. E047836, 2010 WL 597186 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 19, 2010) (alternate holdings that testifying expert's reliance
on non-testifying analyst's report was not testimonial, objection
waived and any error harmless and thus not prejudicial under
Strickland62)
362 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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People v. Felix, No. B210054, 2010 WL 7124 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan.
4, 2010) (holding testimonial a witness's statement that the murder
victim had told witnesses the defendant had threatened her, but the
error was harmless)
People v. Vasquez, No. E047613, 2010 WL 1972957 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 18, 2010) (waiver primary holding; secondary holding
no Crawford violation in gang expert's reliance on police reports
in forming opinion)
People v. Bae Hyuk Shin, 2d Crim. No. B212544, 2010 WL
3341808 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2010) (error was harmless
assuming Crawford violation existed where medical examiner
based opinion on report prepared by non-testifying examiner who
performed autopsy)
People v. Lipsey, No. B216787, 2010 WL 4886219 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 2, 2010) (error was harmless assuming prosecution did not
exercise due diligence in securing declarant's attendance at trial
before offering preliminary hearing testimony)
People v. Romero, No. B211846, 2010 WL 1097545 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 25, 2010) (holding that permitting medical examiner to
opine on cause of death based on autopsy report prepared by
another doctor waived objection, and counsel was ineffective for
failure to object)
People v. Hill, 2d Crim. No. B212445, 2010 WL 277065 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 26, 2010) (primary holding was that the defense waived
its Crawford objection to hearsay statements about a prior offense;
secondary holding that the defendant had prior opportunity to
cross-examine declarant during a prior prosecution was dubious)
People v. Hammers, No. F057344, 2010 WL 797616 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 1, 2010) (Crawford claim waived; merits not addressed)
People v. Shaw, No. G041796, 2010 WL 5264562 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 21, 2010) (assuming Crawford error in permitting DNA
expert to testify based on reports prepared by non-testifying
analysts, error was harmless where defendant admitted identity)
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People v. Price, No. E047834, 2010 WL 3994177 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 13, 2010) (finding Crawford error in expert testimony by
medical examiner based on report of autopsy conducted by a non-
testifying doctor, but this error was harmless)
In re Amanda A., No. A129196, 2010 WL 4059949 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 18, 2010) (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim
based on failure to raise Crawford objection where overwhelming
evidence precluded the finding of prejudice required by
Strickland3 63)
People v. Martinez, No. G040035, 2010 WL 4471405 (Cal. Ct.
App. Nov. 9, 2010) (holding Crawford claim was waived and
remanding for hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel)
People v. Simmons, No. B211208, 2010 WL 550449 (Cal. Ct.
App. Feb. 18, 2010) (Crawford error was held harmless)
People v. Ayala, No. G042906, 2010 WL 5232954 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 23, 2010) (without deciding whether permitting DNA expert
to testify based on reports of non-testifying analyst violated
Crawford, any error held harmless)
People v. Calderon, No. F057554, 2010 WL 3133594 (Cal. Ct.
App. Aug. 10, 2010) (Crawford objection was made to expert
testimony based on the report of non-testifying medical examiner
waived; ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on failure to
object because the failure was not prejudicial)
People v. Gonzalez, No. B217424, 2010 WL 1463197 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 14, 2010) (Crawford claim rejected as waived and any
error which occurred was harmless; alternative ground: debatable
holding that out-of-court statements were not offered for the truth)
People v. Standifer, No. A122054, 2010 WL 2336529 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 11, 2010) (primary holding found; alternative holding
363 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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found characterization of waiver victim's report of an attack to
patrolling police was debatable and the victim's identification of
the defendant as one of the assailants not testimonial)
People v. Salazar, No. C063384, 2010 WL 5066327 (Cal. Ct.
App. Dec. 13, 2010) (holding Crawford claim was waived and
rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim for lack of
prejudice)
People v. Johnson, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(victim's 911 call while driving away from scene of attempted
murder held not testimonial)
People v. Nelson, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(shooting victim's statement to firefighter in ambulance en route
to hospital naming defendant as shooter held not testimonial)
People v. Redd, 229 P.3d 101 (Cal. 2010) (defendant waived
Crawford objection to admission of pre-trial identifications by
eyewitnesses who testified at trial; objection without merit in any
event)
People v. Cowan, 236 P.3d 1074 (Cal. 2010) (rejecting Crawford
claim respecting declarant who testified at trial)
People v. Hollinquest, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(holding declarant validly claimed Fifth Amendment privilege and
so was unavailable, and that opportunity for cross-examination at
preliminary hearing was adequate despite lack of complete
discovery at that time)
People v. Chikosi, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(rejecting Crawford challenge to police testimony based on
alcohol-testing equipment tested by nontestifying officers, review
granted,114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 62 (Cal. Aug. 11, 2010))
People v. Benitez, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(finding reversible Crawford error where police lab supervisor
testified that based on report prepared by nontestifying analyst
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substance seized from defendant was methamphetamine), review
granted, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 329 (Cal. May 12, 2010)
People v. Bowman, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(rejecting Crawford challenge to supervisor's testimony that
substance seized from defendant was methamphetamine, based on
reports prepared by nontestifying analyst), review granted, 110
Cal. Rptr. 3d 611 (Cal. June 9, 2010)
People v. Navarrete, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(reversing on other grounds and so not passing on defendant's
Crawford claim)
People v. Miller, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(rejecting Crawford challenge to DNA expert's testimony based
on reports of nontestifying analyst), review granted, 117 Cal. Rptr.
3d 614 (Cal. Nov. 10, 2010)
People v. Herrera, 232 P.3d 710 (Cal. 2010) (finding state had
exercised due diligence in attempting to secure attendance of
preliminary-hearing witness at trial, reversing court of appeals and
reinstating conviction)
People v. Minor, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(holding Crawford inapplicable in proceeding to extend period of
probation)
People v. D'Arcy, 226 P.3d 949 (Cal. 2010) (rejecting Crawford
challenge to dying declaration)
People v. Lynch, 237 P.3d 416 (Cal. 2010) (holding conversation
between victim and victim's mother in hospital not testimonial
absent record evidence of police participation in the conversation)
People v. Jennings, 237 P.3d 474 (Cal. 2010) (declining to reach
merits of Crawford claim finding any error harmless)
People v. Letner, 235 P.3d 62 (Cal. 2010) (holding letters between
defendants and an associate not testimonial hearsay)
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